Recycling channel selection and coordination in dual sales channel closed-loop supply chains

Zheng, Benrong; Chu, Jie; Jin, Liang

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2021.02.022

Cited by 77 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Choi, Li and Xu [14] examine the performance of closed-loop supply chains under different channel leadership and find that the retailer-led model is the most effective. Considering some certain circumstances, e.g., competition [15], governance mechanisms [3], dual sales channel [16], they study the recycling channel selection or closed-loop supply chain leadership. Other studies have examined recycling decisions, such as the price of the end-of-life products, the collection rate, and recovery efforts [17,18].…”

Section: Reverse Logistics Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade-in Strategy and Competition between Two Independent Remanufacturers

Feng

Luo

Liu

2021

IJERPH

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Trade-in strategy is a common mode of promotion for firms taking part in the circular economy because it encourages consumers to buy remanufactured products, via a “trade-old-for-remanufactured” framework. This paper studies trade-in strategy by developing game models for a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two independent remanufacturers. The former is responsible for producing and selling new products and the latter two compete with each other for the collection of used products and the sales of remanufactured products. Unlike the extant literature, this paper focuses on the competition between two independent remanufacturers (IRs) and studies on how holder segment (whether or not to own used products) and competition affects the trade-in strategy. It finds that the proportion of holders on the remanufactured product prices of the IR1 and IR2 have a negative correlation. Conversely, the impact of the proportion of holders on the IR1’s and IR2’s demands (and on their profits) is the opposite. The trade-in strategy generates more benefits for the IR1 only when the proportion of holders is sufficiently high. In addition, when consumers experience a greater difference in durability between remanufactured products and original new products, trade-in strategy is more welcomed by consumers, which in turn, generates more benefits for the IR1.

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Section: Reverse Logistics Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade-in Strategy and Competition between Two Independent Remanufacturers

Feng

Luo

Liu

2021

IJERPH

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“…Under the context of a competitive framework, Savaskan and Van Wassenhove [8] design a contract consisting of wholesale price, transfer buy-back price and fixed slotting fee, which effectively coordinate the CLSC with competing retailers. Zheng et al [7], Zheng et al [36] show that the dual-channel CLSC coordination under different power structures (i.e., manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and third-party-led power structures) and recycling channel modes (i.e., manufacturingcollecting, retailer-collecting, and third-party-collection modes) can be achieved. Similarly, Yi and Yuan [37], Xie et al [38], Taleizadeh et al [39], Zhang et al [40], Liu et al [41] show that suitable coordination contracts can essentially be used as a strategic tool to mitigate the conflict between direct and retail channels.…”

Section: Clsc Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Let c m and c r be the unit production cost of manufacturing the new product and remanufactured product, respectively. Both the survey and existing literature suggest that remanufacturing a product is less costly than manufacturing a new product, i.e., c r < c m [5,7,42]. Focusing on investigating how retailer co-opetition would affect the CLSC's decisions and profits, we further assume that there is no distinction between the new and remanufactured products, which is commonly adopted in the CLSC literature and also consistent with many remanufacturing practices [4,5].…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, it is worthwhile to explore how the CLSC coordination under different retailer co-opetition modes can be realized by means of designing appropriate contracts. The existing studies regarding pricing strategies and coordination operations in CLSCs are based primarily on the assumption of an independent retailer [4][5][6][7]. Few studies extend the no competition case to the competition case by taking into account two competitive retailers [8][9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Retailer Co-Opetition Impacts Pricing, Collecting and Coordination in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

et al. 2021

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The cooperative and competitive (i.e., co-opetition) behavior between retailers plays a significant role in the development of operations and marketing strategies in a supply chain. Specifically, retailers’ co-opetition relationship pivotally influences the sustainable performance in a closed-loop supply chain. This study examines the impact of retailer co-opetition on pricing, collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Based on observations in some industries (e.g., electronic manufacturing, fabric and textile, etc.), the cooperative and competitive relationships between retailers can be classified into the following three different modes: Bertrand competition, Stackelberg competition, and Collusion. In this paper, we establish a centralized and three decentralized game-theoretic models under these three co-opetition modes and characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. The results indicate that the Bertrand competition mode yields the highest return rate, which is also superior to the other two modes for both the manufacturer and the supply chain system in terms of profitability. However, it can be shown that which mode benefits the retailers would depend on the degree of competition between the retailers and the relative remanufacturing efficiency. Interestingly, we find that the retailer’s first-move advantage does not necessarily lead to higher profits. In addition, we design a modified two-part tariff contract to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chains under three different retailer co-opetition modes, and the results suggest that the optimal contractual parameters in the contracts highly rely on the remanufacturing efficiency and the competition degree between the two retailers. Several managerial insights for firms, consumers and policy makers are provided through numerical analysis.

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“…They found that a revenue and cost-sharing contract could improve the profit of supply chain enterprises. [24] focused on the dual-channel closed supply chain with recycling channel selection and found that price contracts could improve the profit of the supply chain' enterprise. Although the reports above considered coordination problems in the context of a dual-channel supply chain, these studies did not consider the sustainability of products, an important environmental feature.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination strategy for a dual-channel electricity supply chain with sustainability

Chen

Jing

Zhong

2022

JIMO

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper describes the construction of a dual-channel electricity supply chain, with an electricity generation enterprise as the leader and an electricity retail enterprise as the follower, examining sustainability and price decision-making, and formulates a coordination contract to improve electricity supply chain performance. The main results are as follows. Firstly, sensitivity to electricity sustainability contributes to increased electricity sustainability, electricity price, electricity demand, and supply chain enterprises' profits. Secondly, a centralized model is conducive to investment in more sustainable energy production. Finally, electricity supply chain system coordination can be realized by combining revenue-sharing and cost-sharing in a fixed compensation contract.</p>

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Recycling channel selection and coordination in dual sales channel closed-loop supply chains

Cited by 77 publications

References 54 publications

Trade-in Strategy and Competition between Two Independent Remanufacturers

Trade-in Strategy and Competition between Two Independent Remanufacturers

How Retailer Co-Opetition Impacts Pricing, Collecting and Coordination in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Coordination strategy for a dual-channel electricity supply chain with sustainability

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