In the public administration literature, ways in which perceptions of red tape vary between different parts of the public sector remains relatively unexplored. In this article we define organizational red tape as a subject-dependent concept; that is, we expect to see variations in the level and type of red tape between different internal stakeholder groups. We then explain variations with two organizational-based variables, professionalization and marketization. The empirical analysis is undertaken on nearly 800 English local government services. The framework correctly predicts that officials in highly professionalized and marketized services perceive higher levels of red tape, while those in less professionalized and marketized services report lower levels. We then summarize our findings and comment on their theoretical and practical significance. Rules can be described as norms, regulations, procedures and expectations that regulate individual behaviour in organizations. Rules exist to ensure accountability, equity and ethical behaviour. As a result, they provide some of the basic building blocks of public administration (see Crozier 1964; Weber 1988) and provide us with knowledge about behaviour, organization and decision making. Public administration has undergone a period of focusing on 'bad rules' or when rule making goes wrong and rules shift from being actions that increase organizational performance to actions that stifle and inhibit it. This perspective is associated with a presumption in the writing on bureaucracy that rules proliferate and result in maladies of which red tape is the most severe.