Reference Group Effects in the Measurement of Personality and Attitudes

Credé, Marcus; Bashshur, Michael Ramsay; Niehorster, Sarah

doi:10.1080/00223891.2010.497393

Cited by 42 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This result may explain why, in apparent conflict with a cognitive model of personality judgments, 63 specifying reference groups reduced predictive validity in a study of conscientiousness. 41 If most people do not naturally tend to compare themselves to a reference group, they may do worse when required to do so. Much of the literature has focused on finding out whether questions could be improved, by specifying their frame of reference, 41,42 reference groups, 63,64 examples, 40 or specific behaviours, 65,66 or by generally reducing temporary, fluctuating influences.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…41 If most people do not naturally tend to compare themselves to a reference group, they may do worse when required to do so. Much of the literature has focused on finding out whether questions could be improved, by specifying their frame of reference, 41,42 reference groups, 63,64 examples, 40 or specific behaviours, 65,66 or by generally reducing temporary, fluctuating influences. 27,28 In risk preference research, Blais and Weber 51 attempted to remove any part played by differences in risk perception.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Many genetic loci linked to risk preferences in a genome-wide association study were identified through the use of similar single-item questions. 39 Here, we took a descriptive approach that lets participants speak because systematically varying questions, examples, and reference frames [40][41][42] would already require deviations from the widely used GRQ. Instead, we asked people to explain how they answered the GRQ and which risks they thought about in order to illuminate how people infer their own risk preferences from their decisions, indecisions, and regrets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

How people know their risk preference

Arslan¹,

Brümmer²,

Dohmen³

et al. 2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

People differ in their willingness to take risks. Recent work found that a dominant class of measures, revealed preference tasks (e.g., laboratory lotteries), appear not to tap into stable individual differences, whereas survey-based stated preferences are stable and predict real-world risk taking across different domains. How can stated preferences, often criticised as inconsequential ("cheap talk"), be more valid and predictive than controlled, incentivized lotteries? In our multi-method study, over 3,000 respondents from population samples answered a single widely used and predictive risk preference question. Respondents then explained the reasoning behind their answer. They tended to recount diagnostic behaviours and experiences, focusing on voluntary, consequential acts and experiences from which they seemed to infer their risk preference. We found that third-party readers of respondents' brief memories and explanations reached similar inferences about respondents' preferences, indicating the intersubjective validity of this information. Our results also shed light on the process of preference formation through experience over the lifespan. Finally, stated risk preferences may capture preferences revealed in behaviours in the wild better than the contrived behavioural tasks preferred in economics because they permit people to draw upon their own understanding of what constitutes diagnostic behaviours and experiences.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How people know their risk preference

Arslan¹,

Brümmer²,

Dohmen³

et al. 2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To more affluent raters, they seem less competent, because their wealth no longer needs to be explained by the target’s traits. Existing research suggests that raters use the ingroup as a comparison standard in the judgment of personality (Credé, Bashshur, & Niehorster, 2010), even in the case of minimal groups (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1953). As such, outgroup members were generally rated in contrast to the ingroup across personality facets in the current research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rater wealth predicts perceptions of outgroup competence

Chan

McCrae²,

Rogers³

et al. 2011

Journal of Research in Personality

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

National income has a pervasive influence on the perception of ingroup stereotypes, with high status and wealthy targets perceived as more competent. In two studies we investigated the degree to which economic wealth of raters related to perceptions of outgroup competence. Raters’ economic wealth predicted trait ratings when 1) raters in 48 other cultures rated Americans’ competence and 2) Mexican Americans rated Anglo Americans’ competence. Rater wealth also predicted ratings of interpersonal warmth on the culture level. In conclusion, raters’ economic wealth, either nationally or individually, is significantly associated with perception of outgroup members, supporting the notion that ingroup conditions or stereotypes function as frames of reference in evaluating outgroup traits.

show abstract

“…Furthermore , Credé, Bashshur, and Niehorster (2010) demonstrated that measures instructing participants to use specific reference groups generally lead to decreased criterion validity of those scales. In our study, the Goldberg adjective measures of Neuroticism and Extraversion were the only measures to employ such an instruction set.…”

Section: Basic Implications Of Our Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self–Other Agreement and Assumed Similarity in Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Trait Affect

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Trait Negative Affect (NA) and Positive Affect (PA) are strongly associated with Neuroticism and Extraversion, respectively. Nevertheless, measures of the former tend to show substantially weaker self-other agreement-and stronger assumed similarity correlations-than scales assessing the latter. The current study separated the effects of item content versus format on agreement and assumed similarity using two different sets of Neuroticism and Extraversion measures and two different indicators of NA and PA (N = 381 newlyweds). Neuroticism and Extraversion consistently showed stronger agreement than NA and PA; in addition, however, scales with more elaborated items yielded significantly higher agreement correlations than those based on single adjectives. Conversely, the trait affect scales yielded stronger assumed similarity correlations than the personality scales; these coefficients were strongest for the adjectival measures of trait affect. Thus, our data establish a significant role for both content and format in assumed similarity and self-other agreement.

show abstract

Reference Group Effects in the Measurement of Personality and Attitudes

Cited by 42 publications

References 34 publications

How people know their risk preference

How people know their risk preference

Rater wealth predicts perceptions of outgroup competence

Self–Other Agreement and Assumed Similarity in Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Trait Affect

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About