Reflections on the Study of Generations in Politics

Stoker, Laura

doi:10.1515/for-2014-5012

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Given the severe impact of the economic and financial crisis in Ireland post-2008, one would expect this dimension to play a key role in Irish politics (Costello, 2017;Reidy and Suiter, 2017). If liberal moral values are primarily associated with the increased alignment of Irish values with pan-European liberalism (Berger, 2001), and the experience of such European integration varies significantly depending on one's socio-economic status (Kriesi, 2014), then the socialization into those more liberal values will also likely depend on one's position in society (Stoker, 2014). In other words, we can expect the key demographic factors that underlie the new cleavage of globalisation politics to also affect attitudes towards abortion.…”

Section: H1mentioning

confidence: 99%

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

et al. 2020

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The outcomes of two recent Irish referendums -on marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018 -have placed contemporary Irish voters in sharp contrast with their long-standing conservative Catholic reputation. These referendums also stand out internationally because of the associated deliberative innovation. This paper aims to explain the watershed abortion vote drawing on theories of generational change, issue-voting, cue-taking and deliberative democracy, using data from an exit poll at the 2018 abortion referendum. We show that age and cleavage effects are key to understanding the referendum outcome. These results offer insight into how societal processes such as rapid secularisation, generational replacement and democratic innovations shape politics. Moreover, voters who were aware of the deliberative innovation were more likely to support the liberal referendum option. To increase willingness to deviate from the status quo, engaging citizens actively in the debate is a fruitful approach.

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Section: H1mentioning

confidence: 99%

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

et al. 2020

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“…Research has repeatedly stressed the importance of age ; life experience is tied to political orientations (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) and critical behaviours (Henn & Foard, 2012; see, e.g., Stoker, 2014 for an overview).…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do We Know About People’s Politics? Testing a New Framework for Understanding Different Conceptions of Politics

Görtz

2023

Alternatives: Global, Local, Political

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This study aims to increase the understanding of citizens’ different conceptions of politics. This is done by constructing a framework based on Heywood’s seminal works (2002; 2004) on three prominent understandings of politics. Guided by the framework and adopting a factor-analytic approach using the National SOM survey conducted in Sweden in autumn 2020 ( N = 1845), I found two theoretically interesting dimensions: a ‘macro-politics’ dimension that covers content related to government and the welfare state and a ‘micro-politics’ dimension that concerns content associated with everyday life. The largest group of respondents consists of people whose conceptions of politics solely cover ‘macro-politics’ (76.4%). The second largest group are those who do not consider either of these two dimensions to be political (12.9%). The opposite view to this, which combines ‘macro-politics’ and ‘micro-politics’, is held by a slightly smaller group (9.4%). A minor group was also found, consisting of people whose conception of politics only covers ‘micro-politics’ (1.2%). We ran analyses based on previous important findings on people’s conceptions of politics. Contrary to prevailing knowledge, the results show that left-leaners conceptualize (only) ‘micro-politics’ content as political more frequently than right-leaners, older people do not perceive more content as political than younger people (but view different content as political), and women, compared to men, identify more areas as political irrespective of content.

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“…There is a long and substantial sociological literature on generations and a fair amount of it involves disambiguation around the term "generation" itself McCammon 2003, 2007;Braungart and Braungart 1986;Kertzer 1983;Mannheim 1952;Stoker 2014;White 2013). Alwin and McCammon (2007) distinguish among three distinct usages of generation: "as positions in lines of descent," "as cohorts," and "as historical participation."…”

Section: Defining Generationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 There have been so many attempts in sociological literature to pin down a definitive terminology for these various conceptions of generation (Alwin and McCammon 2007;Braungart and Braungart 1986;Bristow 2016b;Mannheim 1952;Riley, Johnson, and Foner 1972;Ryder 1965;Stoker 2014;White 2013). Alwin and McCammon (2007), for example, call these historical generations "Generation" with a capital "G." For whatever it's worth, my preferred terminology is lineage generation (Stoker 2014), cohorts (Ryder 1965), and romantic-historical generations (Mannheim 1952(Mannheim [1928). people of the same age encounter significant historical events or cultural currents and gain a sense of self-identification as members of a generation group (Mannheim 1952(Mannheim [1928).…”

Section: Defining Generationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Generationalism: Generational Antagonism and Partisan Polarization

Lindner¹

2023

Preprint

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Despite the prevalence of generational labels like Boomers, Gen X, Millennials, and Gen Z in popular discourse, most studies of generationalism have been restricted to content analyses of generational rhetoric. This study investigates the prevalence of negative generationalism, or negative affective sentiment towards perceived generational out-groups, within the U.S. public and considers how it may be linked with partisan political identities. Using a nationally representative survey of 1,232 Americans, this research examines the association between generational self-identity and partisan identity using feeling thermometer scores for four generational groups (Boomers, Gen Xers, Millennials, and Gen Z) and the two major political parties (Democrats and Republicans). I also report the findings of an experimental manipulation testing the extent to which generational priming exacerbates affective partisan polarization. The results reveal strong evidence of positive affect towards one's generational in-group, but a less consistent pattern of negative generationalism. Neither the correlational nor the experimental outcomes support a strong and consistent link between generationalism and partisanship, though Republicans feel significantly warmer towards Baby Boomers and colder towards Gen Z than independents. Despite the largely null findings concerning partisanship, this study reveals that these generational labels do appear to bear some degree of social meaning as social identities for people, pointing to new directions for future sociological research on generationalism.

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Reflections on the Study of Generations in Politics

Cited by 10 publications

References 47 publications

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

What Do We Know About People’s Politics? Testing a New Framework for Understanding Different Conceptions of Politics

The New Generationalism: Generational Antagonism and Partisan Polarization

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