Reforming the Match: A Proposal for a New 3-Phase System

Monir, Joseph G.

doi:10.4300/jgme-d-19-00425.1

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 5 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…As programs pilot multiple initiatives for applicant recruitment and interviews, this application cycle creates several research opportunities, such as examining which mechanisms help applicants best determine program fit remotely. As web-based interviewing may potentially save applicants thousands of dollars by eliminating travel costs, [29][30][31][32][33][34] broad-scale studies can examine whether virtual interviews benefit applicants across demographic and socioeconomic lines. Studies on how often applicants match into one of their top-choice programs compared to prior years are also warranted.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fostering Certainty in an Uncertain Era of Virtual Residency Interviews

Ashrafzadeh

Nambudiri

2020

Journal of Graduate Medical Education

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Fostering Certainty in an Uncertain Era of Virtual Residency Interviews

Ashrafzadeh

Nambudiri

2020

Journal of Graduate Medical Education

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“…Another possibility might be to provide an incentive for applicants to apply to fewer programs. The Early Result Acceptance Program (ERAP) [ 28 ] and similar proposals [ 29 , 30 ] call for a two-round system with limited applications in the initial round. Applicants who do not match (or do not apply) in the first round may apply to unlimited programs in a second round.…”

Section: Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application Fever: Reviewing the Causes, Costs, and Cures for Residency Application Inflation

Carmody¹,

Rosman²,

Carlson³

2021

Cureus

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Over the past decade, the number of residency applications submitted per applicant has nearly doubled. This epidemic of "Application Fever" is expensive for applicants, burdensome for programs, and ultimately does not improve overall Match outcomes. In this review, we discuss the phenomenon of Application Fever, with a focus on contributing factors and costs of this behavior. Application Fever has its origins in the early 1990s. At that time, the number of residency applicants began to outpace the number of available positions. Because an applicant who applies to more residency programs has a greater probability of securing a residency position than an otherwise equivalent applicant who applies to fewer, "overapplication" became a dominant strategy and residency applicants began to apply to more residency programs each year. This trend was enhanced and enabled by the introduction of the Electronic Residency Application Service (ERAS). Although Application Fever is a rational decision for applicants, it imposes a substantial evaluative burden on program directors and necessitates the use of convenience screening metrics. We then briefly review potential solutions, including informational strategies, application limits, and marketplace incentives to reduce application numbers. Although a fixed cap on applications would reduce application numbers and facilitate a holistic selection process, greater transparency from residency programs regarding their selection criteria would be required to help applicants choose where to apply. To improve the residency application process for programs and applicants alike, we call upon the medical community to further study Application Fever and carefully consider solutions, including fixed application caps.

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“…1,2 Joseph G. Monir, MD, put forth a 3-phase system for reforming the Match in the February 2020 issue of the Journal of Graduate Medical Education. 3 Phase 1 allowed applicants to apply to a limited number of programs. Phase 2, for those who had not matched, allowed for an unlimited number of applications.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Phase 3 is similar to the current SOAP process. 3 There are a subset of students who currently implement a very restricted version of Phase 1, targeting only a single program, and the term applied to this is to ''suicide match.'' The act of ''suicide matching'' refers to one's decision to list a single program as the sole occupant of their rank list.…”

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confidence: 99%