2014
DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2014.893644
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Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist System: Greece during the Mitsotakis Administration (1990–93)

Abstract: Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the anticipated gains are often dispersed across the population and too uncertain to animate strong popular support. This pattern may exhibit different characteristics in a clientelist economy where the affected groups are client groups under the protection of political parties. The reform agenda of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990-1993) illustrates that the collective action pr… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…For instance, mass party organisations can facilitate clientelistic exchange because they provide the social networks through which the exchange can take place, and where supporters can be mobilised and rewarded (Belloni et al 1979: 255). Networks of clientelistic exchange can also entail tight organisational connections between parties and mass-based organised interests, such as trade unions, where the electoral support of trade union members is exchanged for future jobs, pay increases, or benefits targeted at specific occupations (Trantidis 2014). We do not argue that large party memberships or organic connections between parties and unions necessarily lead to the development of clientelistic linkages, but that clientelistic strategies need these structures to develop into "mass clientelism" as a system to distribute state resources.…”
Section: Clientelistic Linkages and Fiscal Austeritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, mass party organisations can facilitate clientelistic exchange because they provide the social networks through which the exchange can take place, and where supporters can be mobilised and rewarded (Belloni et al 1979: 255). Networks of clientelistic exchange can also entail tight organisational connections between parties and mass-based organised interests, such as trade unions, where the electoral support of trade union members is exchanged for future jobs, pay increases, or benefits targeted at specific occupations (Trantidis 2014). We do not argue that large party memberships or organic connections between parties and unions necessarily lead to the development of clientelistic linkages, but that clientelistic strategies need these structures to develop into "mass clientelism" as a system to distribute state resources.…”
Section: Clientelistic Linkages and Fiscal Austeritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The High Court stipulated that the areas planned with this specific tool should be proposed by the statutory plan. This failure was also associated with a general failure to liberalise and privatise crucial economic sectors, which had, up until then, been under state control (Trantidis, 2014). The reintroduction of this tool through a similar one called PERPO (“Special Regulation Planning Areas”) by the later Law 2508/1997 of the PASOK government, and the provision for its designation by a GUP, did not made the tool more successful.…”
Section: Public Land Policy and Urban Planning Reforms From The 1980smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In all of the above variants of politicisation public administrators are expected to come and go together with the incumbent who selected them. The inter-relation of power between the political patron and the appointed client-administrator can become detrimental for managing an effective public administration reform agenda (Trantidis, 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%