Regulating dynamic congestion externalities with tradable credit schemes: Does a unique equilibrium exist?

Bao, Yue; Verhoef, Erik T.; Koster, Paul

doi:10.1016/j.trb.2019.07.012

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Moreover, Bao et al. ( 2019 ) show that option B.1 might lead to an unstable equilibrium in the standard bottleneck model, and therefore the welfare gain it provides is also uncertain.…”

Section: Practical Demand Management Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social distancing in public transport: mobilising new technologies for demand management under the Covid-19 crisis

2021

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Dense urban areas are especially hardly hit by the Covid-19 crisis due to the limited availability of public transport, one of the most efficient means of mass mobility. In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, public transport operators are experiencing steep declines in demand and fare revenues due to the perceived risk of infection within vehicles and other facilities. The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities of implementing social distancing in public transport in line with epidemiological advice. Social distancing requires effective demand management to keep vehicle occupancy rates under a predefined threshold, both spatially and temporally. We review the literature of five demand management methods enabled by new information and ticketing technologies: (i) inflow control with queueing, (ii) time and space dependent pricing, (iii) capacity reservation with advance booking, (iv) slot auctioning, and (v) tradeable travel permit schemes. Thus the paper collects the relevant literature into a single point of reference, and provides interpretation from the viewpoint of practical applicability during and after the pandemic.

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“…Moreover, Bao et al. ( 2019 ) show that option B.1 might lead to an unstable equilibrium in the standard bottleneck model, and therefore the welfare gain it provides is also uncertain.…”

Section: Practical Demand Management Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social distancing in public transport: mobilising new technologies for demand management under the Covid-19 crisis

2021

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“…Along related lines, Xiao et al ( 2013) study a tradable credit system (consisting of a time-varying credit charged at the bottleneck wherein the credits can be traded and the price is determined by a competitive market) to manage morning commute congestion with both homogenous and heterogeneous users. More recently, Bao et al (2019) studied the existence of equilibria under tradable credit schemes using different models of dynamic congestion and Akamatsu and Wada (2017) proposed a tradable bottleneck credit scheme where the regulator issues link-and time-specific credits permitting passage through a certain link or bottleneck in a pre-specified time period. They develop a model to describe time-dependent flow patterns at equilibrium under a system of tradable bottleneck permits for general networks and show that the equilibrium obtained under this system is efficient in that it minimizes the social transportation cost.…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis and Design of Markets for Tradable MobilityCredit Schemes

Chen¹,

Seshadri²,

Azevedo³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Tradable mobility credit (TMC) schemes are an approach to travel demand management that have received significant attention in the transportation domain in recent years as a promising means to mitigate the adverse environmental, economic and social effects of urban traffic congestion. In TMC schemes, a regulator provides an initial endowment of mobility credits (or tokens) to all potential travelers. In order to use the transportation system, travelers need to spend a certain amount of tokens (tariff) that could vary with their choice of mode, route, departure time etc. The tokens can be bought and sold in a market that is managed by and operated by a regulator at a price that is dynamically determined by the demand and supply of tokens. This paper proposes and analyzes alternative market models for a TMC system (focusing on market design aspects such as allocation/expiration of credits, rules governing trading, transaction costs, regulator intervention, price dynamics), and develops a methodology to explicitly model the dis-aggregate behavior of individuals within the market. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted within a departure time context for the morning commute problem to

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“…Following this, a significant tranche of research has been conducted to seek the applicability of TCS in traffic management. e extensions include user heterogeneity [14][15][16][17][18], day-to-day dynamic [19][20][21], network design [22,23], bottleneck management [12,[24][25][26][27][28][29][30], multimodal network [31][32][33], environmental issue [34][35][36][37], equity issue [38,39], public-private partnership [40,41], and autonomous vehicle management [42,43]. is paper aims to investigate one aspect that has hitherto received little attention, namely, the optimal credit scheme design in the context of probit-based stochastic user equilibrium (SUE).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Tradable Credit Scheme Design with Recommended Credit Price

Zhang

Lü

2021

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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As an interesting research topic in transportation field, tradable credit scheme (TCS) has been extensively explored in the latest decade. Existing studies implicitly assumed that travelers are clear about the equilibrium credit price and make their trips accordingly. However, this may not be the case in reality, since the credit price is endogenously determined by the credit-trading behavior, especially in the early stages after the implementation of a TCS. Considering travelers’ uncertainty on the equilibrium credit price, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of perception error on credit price and how to accommodate such errors by an appropriate scheme design. Transferring the perception error on credit price to a given and fixed value released by central authority, we first investigate the impacts of recommended credit price under a given TCS. The numerical results imply that it is necessary to simultaneously consider the choice of recommended credit price and charging scheme in TCS design. Regarding this, we combine the goals of social welfare and public acceptance of the scheme and propose a bilevel biobjective programming (BLBOP) model, by which the net economic benefit is maximized while the gap between the recommended and realized credit prices is minimized. Through two numerical examples, it is found that the rise in perception variance could intensify the contradiction effect between the two objectives. Additionally, a nonnegligible price gap must be allowed to occur to maintain the effectiveness of a TCS.

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Regulating dynamic congestion externalities with tradable credit schemes: Does a unique equilibrium exist?

Cited by 22 publications

References 21 publications

Social distancing in public transport: mobilising new technologies for demand management under the Covid-19 crisis

Social distancing in public transport: mobilising new technologies for demand management under the Covid-19 crisis

Analysis and Design of Markets for Tradable MobilityCredit Schemes

Optimal Tradable Credit Scheme Design with Recommended Credit Price

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