Regulating Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes

Nigeria: In Search of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme

“…These included the creation of separate federal States in the Niger Delta, viz Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Bayelsa States in 1987, 1991 (Omotola, 2007), the increase in the percentage of revenue allocation based on derivation from 1.5% to 3% in 1992 and 13% in 1999 (Osaghae, 2008) (African Concord, 1990; (Note 2), the Ogoni genocide (The News May, 1993; ) (Note 6) among several communities in the Niger Delta. The protesters in these communities not only have their properties destroyed but were also killed, maimed, raped, displaced or forced into exile (Oshionebo, 2009;Ekine, 2008). The local inhabitants see these as a form of repression to keep them (minorities) from voicing even the most moderate claims.…”

“…Long years of neglect and conflict have promoted, especially among youths a feeling of a bleak future, and thus see conflict as a stratagem to escape deprivation (Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006). This resulted in the government cracking down with the strong support, active influence and connivance of the oil multinational corporations (MNCs), which reached a crescendo with extra-judicial hanging of the Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other kinsmen in November 1995, by the infamous government of the maximum ruler-General Sani Abacha (Oshionebo, 2009). The resultant effect was the outbreak of armed conflicts in the area, abduction and kidnapping of oil workers, especially the expatriates.…”

Corporations and Nations: Power Imbalance in the Extractive Sector

“…Although regulatory agencies in developing countries have wide‐ranging regulatory and remedial powers, laws are rarely enforced against extractive TNCs, partly because these agencies lack the capacity and political will to regulate TNCs. For example, statutory provisions empowering regulatory agencies to terminate mineral leases where the holder of a lease fails to comply with statutory requirements are not enforced in many developing countries (Oshionebo : 69). Thus, for the most part, extractive TNCs operate in these countries without fear of regulatory sanctions.…”

“…More ominously, the multilayered and offshore ownership structure of extractive TNCs serves as a conduit for corruption, money laundering, and bribery in developing countries (African Progress Panel 61). For example, without assistance from the networks provided by TNCs, dictators and warlords in Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have had difficulty sustaining their power (Oshionebo ).…”

“…The demonstrated ability of TNCs to influence governments across the globe gives credence to the view that society is unlikely to effectively restrain corporate power unless it devises means to counterbalance corporate power. In a previous work, I identified three counterbalancing forces that could restrain corporate power: the state (government), market forces, and civil society (Oshionebo : 212–216). The state can counterbalance and restrain the power of TNCs through statutory provisions, provided, of course, that the state enforces regulatory provisions effectively and consistently.…”