Regulation by participation

Sertel, Murat R.

doi:10.1007/bf01234606

Cited by 27 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In the first stage, the government, taking into account how firms will react to the subsidy, maximize (3). It happens that the optimal subsidy, prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus and welfare in this case are identical with those in Subsection 3.2, subsidized mixed duopoly.…”

Section: Subsidized Private Duopolymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The pioneering theoretical work on mixed oligopoly was done by [1]. Since then, the analysis of mixed market models that incorporate public firms has received increasing attention and has been widely performed by many researchers (see, for example, [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]). 1 As is well known, there has been a worldwide wave of privatization of public enterprises since the nineteen-eighties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Ohnishi¹

2012

M2ECONOMICS

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This paper focuses on the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand mixed duopoly. The paper examines four regimes: mixed and private duopoly, each with and without subsidies. The results of this study are compared with the findings of the existing Cournot mixed market literature. As a result, the paper shows that that the introduction of production subsidies into the analyses of Bertrand and Cournot mixed markets can improve social welfare.

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Section: Subsidized Private Duopolymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Ohnishi¹

2012

M2ECONOMICS

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“…Earlier literature examines mixed oligopoly models in a domestic context (see, e.g., Merill and Schneider, 1966;Thisse, 1989 and1991;DeFraja and Delbono, 1989;Harris and Wiens, 1980;Sertel, 1988;Fershtman, 1990;DeFraja and Delbono, 1990) while some more recent literature includes foreign private firms (Fjell and Pal, 1996;and Pal and White, 1998). The introduction of foreign firms affects outcomes because the welfare maximizing public firm ignores the producer surplus of the foreign firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms

Fjell

Heywood

2002

Australian Economic Papers

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This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximizing leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatization are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.JEL: D43, L10, L13

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“…Since then, its applications have been growing steadily from the study of domestic mixed oligopoly markets (Harris & Wiens, 1980;Sertel, 1988;Cremer, Marchand, & Thisse, 1989, 1991DeFraja & Delbono, 1989, 1990Fershtman, 1990;Nilssen & Sorgard, 2002;Matsumura & Kanada, 2005), to analysing the role of foreign competition in such markets (Fjell & Pal, 1996;Pal & White, 1998;Fjell & Heywood, 2002;Heywood & Ye, 2010). Recently, a growing number of authors have used a mixed oligopoly structure to study multinational markets (Pal & White, 2003;Dadpay & Heywood, 2006;Heywood & Ye, 2009;Dadpay, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic Policies as Strategic Measures in Multinational Markets

Dadpay

2016

IJEF

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This paper studies the role of privatization and subsidization policies as trade strategies in a single multinational market where private and public firms of different nationalities interact. The paper finds that when a country subsidizes its industry the rival country would have the incentive to retaliate by adopting a subsidization regime to prevent a free riders' situation from happening when said country moves to liberalize the market. However, this step does not eliminate the free rider problem governmentsare face in a market when they privatize their public firms unilaterally.

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Regulation by participation

Cited by 27 publications

References 10 publications

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms

Domestic Policies as Strategic Measures in Multinational Markets

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