Regulation of Interest Groups in Israel

Yishai, Yael

doi:10.1093/pa/51.4.568

Cited by 13 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…An early attempt to regulate interest groups lobbying in Israel in 1954 was blocked by parties and unions unwilling to accept state regulation. Yishai (, pp. 570–573) wrote that Israeli MKs had been complaining about the pushing and shoving by lobbyists for many years.…”

Section: Research Questions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Israeli MKs had been complaining about the pushing and shoving by lobbyists for many years (Yishai, , p. 573). After studying the declaration of MK Yechimovich, one of the initiators of the bill that the Lobbyist Law balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public, the following research questions were raised: Who are the actors and what are the reasons for the legislation of the Knesset Law Amendment 25, the Lobbyist Law in Israel, and to what extent does the new Israeli lobbying regulatory regime meet the challenges that lobbying represents?…”

Section: Research Questions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Veksler

2011

Journal of Public Affairs

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After some failed attempts to regulate the lobbying, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—passed the Lobbyist Law on April 2nd 2008. Although lobbying is a common and legitimate part of the democratic process, it raises issues of trust, equality of access, and transparency. What motivated the MKs to regulate lobbying—public interest, private interest, or symbolic politics? The MKs claimed that the law was needed for improving transparency whereas MK Yechimovich declared that it balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public. Assessing the achieved transparency in the comparative framework of other lobbying regulatory regimes, we see that the law confers tangible benefits on powerful interest groups, while providing only symbolic gestures to the public. Lack of information available for MKs creates a need for lobbyists for political intelligence and MKs need to identify the interests in play to guarantee for themselves the necessary legislative subsidy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Research Questions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Research Questions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Veksler

2011

Journal of Public Affairs

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“…Moreover, in both cases, the coalition members can be defined as public interest groups (such as social change movements, ideological organizations and youth movements). Public interest groups are groups that seek to influence public policy rather than to gain benefits for their members (as is the case with private interest groups) (Yishai, : 14–17).…”

Section: A Comparison and Analysis Of The Leading Public Campaign Agamentioning

confidence: 97%

Planning Discourse versus Land Discourse: The 2009–12 Reforms in Land‐Use Planning Policy and Land Policy in Israel

Hananel

2013

Int J Urban Regional Res

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Land policy and land-use planning policy are two types of public policy pertaining to space. In general, land-use planning policy deals with land-use allocation and property rights, whereas land policy defines the land regime of a society. These differences have shaped a unique discourse for each of these policy types. The purpose of this article is to examine the differences and similarities between the land discourse and the planning discourse by analyzing two public campaigns conducted in Israel against two proposed reforms: the 2009 reform of the Israel Land Administration and the 2010-12 reform of the Planning and Building Law. The findings reveal substantive differences between the two campaigns, manifested in the nature of the leading players, the types of public activities they chose, and most notably in the discourses and the hierarchy of considerations they addressed. The findings raise profound questions regarding universal trends in spatial policy reforms; their influence on the activities of public coalitions and the discourses they adopted; possible future effects of these trends on the differences between the land discourse and the planning discourse; and the impact of these trends on the ability of groups and individuals elsewhere to influence spatial policies (such as planning and land policies).

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“…This process has accelerated since the late 1980s. 32 The trend among the religious, the ultra-religious, oriental Jews and certain Russian Jewish immigrants is in the opposite direction. Because of either defensive or offensive considerations, the main trend in these sectors is toward the fortification of traditional social and political institutions, that is, religious communities and factions, family, 'clan' and immigrant associations.…”

Section: The Current Situationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political change and party system transformation

Sheffer

1999

Israel Affairs

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Regulation of Interest Groups in Israel

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Planning Discourse versus Land Discourse: The 2009–12 Reforms in Land‐Use Planning Policy and Land Policy in Israel

Political change and party system transformation

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