Regulatory Delegation in the European Union

Mathieu, Emmanuelle

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8

Cited by 21 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…Therefore, it would be desirable to also investigate how far experimentalist governance strives in less uncertain domains. More generally, these findings support functionalist explanations emphasizing the impact of the need for expertise and information in the creation of non-hierarchical governance mechanisms in the EU (Héritier & Rhodes 2011;Blauberger & Rittberger 2015;Mathieu 2016).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 73%

“…Both telecommunications and electricity exhibit strong elements of "natural monopoly," in which the market can most cheaply be supplied by a single firm because service provision depends on infrastructure that would be economically inefficient to duplicate, such as gas or water pipes, electricity or telecommunications wires, train tracks, or a postal delivery round (Baldwin et al 2012, p. 444). Another major commonality is that, over the past two decades, their regulation has witnessed first the delegation of powers to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in the late 1990s, then the creation of European regulatory networks in the early 2000s, and finally their transformation into EU agencies in the late 2000s (Thatcher 2002(Thatcher , 2011Coen & Thatcher 2005Mathieu 2016). Using hard cases for variation helps by offering stronger claims from the specific examples studied that can be expected to apply across different polities and sectors.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Balancing experimentalist and hierarchical governance in European Union electricity and telecommunications regulation: A matter of degrees

Mathieu

Rangoni

2019

Regulation & Governance

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While the widespread diffusion of experimentalism across sectors and polities is well documented, less is known about the extent of the shift to this non-hierarchical form of governance, which continues to coexist with traditional hierarchical governance and involves more inclusive rulemaking and revision based on review of alternative implementation experiences. By comparing and process-tracing electricity and telecommunications regulation in the European Union, we find diversity in experimentalism over time and across two sectors often considered similar. We explain varying degrees of experimentalism with strategic uncertainty and the constellation of preferences, which we label "de facto polyarchy." Thus, we confirm the emphasis on uncertainty documented in the experimentalist literature, while addressing a conventional critique by also highlighting the relevance of "politics." Moreover, while corroborating the common spread of experimentalism, we suggest that an analytical framework based on ideal types offers the best route forward to develop comparative analysis of experimentalism and non-hierarchical forms of governance more broadly.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 73%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Balancing experimentalist and hierarchical governance in European Union electricity and telecommunications regulation: A matter of degrees

Mathieu

Rangoni

2019

Regulation & Governance

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“…The second network is the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), established by the European Commission in 2003, with a view to foster a consistent application of the EU regulatory framework through coordination among national IRAs. In 2009, with the third legislative package, the ERGEG was transformed into the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), an EU agency built around the network of regulators, meant to formalize the network and to facilitate the adoption of binding regulation at the EU level (Mathieu, 2016).…”

Section: Research Design Operationalization and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multilevel regulatory coordination: The interplay between European Union, federal and regional regulatory agencies

Mathieu

Matthys

Verhoest

et al. 2020

Public Policy and Administration

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We know that European regulatory networks tend to broaden the gap between regulators and executives in the member states. But what is their impact on inter-agencies relationship at the national level? The scope of issues addressed by European regulatory networks may cover the competences of several independent regulatory agencies in the domestic arena. Who is competent to participate in the European regulatory network? What happens with the independent regulatory agency that cannot participate? This can trigger confusion, competence conflicts, but can also be an opportunity to develop coordination among the concerned independent regulatory agency. This situation is particularly delicate in federal states when the concerned independent regulatory agencies are located on different governmental levels. Against the background of interdependent regulatory competences across levels, this article examines the conditions for the rise of inter-independent regulatory agencies coordination regarding their participation in European regulatory networks. Theoretically, we engage with the literature on coordination between federal and subnational governmental actors for European Union affairs and extend its application to regulatory actors. Based on a longitudinal case study on energy regulation in Belgium, we bring three key findings. First, the federal regulator’s acceptance to coordinate is explained by the rising interdependencies between regulators across levels. Second, the regional regulator’s move from a contentious strategy to a more cooperative one is explained by learning. Third, bilateral coordination arrangements may pre-empt the emergence of multilateral ones.

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“…Busuioc and Groenleer (2013) and Busuioc et al (2011) examined the European Police Office, Europol Eurojust's development beyond the design stage. Groenleer (2009) analysed some agencies' de facto autonomy, Mathieu (2016Mathieu ( , 2019 tackled regulatory integration through case studies. Boin et al (2014) addressed agency-led management of transboundary problems and crises, while Scipioni (2018) compared the development of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Frontex with the Commission's growing role in asylum and immigration policy.…”

Section: Agencification and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2011) examined the European Police Office, Europol Eurojust's development beyond the design stage. Groenleer (2009) analysed some agencies' de facto autonomy, Mathieu (2016, 2019) tackled regulatory integration through case studies. Boin et al .…”

Section: Agencification and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Post‐agencification Stage between Reforms and Crises. A Comparative Assessment of EU agencies' Budgetary Development

Migliorati

2020

J of Common Market Studies

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The proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies, known as 'agencification', has been widely studied by scholars of EU governance. In spite of the success in explaining the roots of agencies' establishment, evidence is lacking about their development over time: have they been empowered through new resources, or have their capabilities remained the same? Which EU agencies grew the most, and why? Ultimately, how much do policymakers value these bodies? Through a newly collected longitudinal dataset, the analysis covers EU agencies' budgetary trends in the past three decades and assesses the determinants of their variation through a cross-sectional time series regression analysis and a Traj group-based model. The results show that trends in agencies' budgetary allocation follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern. The observed variation is explained by EU-level crisis response, by the expansion of agencies' tasks and by the type of agency under analysis.

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Regulatory Delegation in the European Union

Cited by 21 publications

References 0 publications

Balancing experimentalist and hierarchical governance in European Union electricity and telecommunications regulation: A matter of degrees

Balancing experimentalist and hierarchical governance in European Union electricity and telecommunications regulation: A matter of degrees

Multilevel regulatory coordination: The interplay between European Union, federal and regional regulatory agencies

The Post‐agencification Stage between Reforms and Crises. A Comparative Assessment of EU agencies' Budgetary Development

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