As regulation increasingly results from the interplay of a wide array of different actors operating at different levels, it has become crucial to focus on how these constellations of regulatory actors operate. Although this research field presents huge potential for theoretical development, we still lack the measurement techniques to allow systematic comparative research. We contribute to filling this gap with four indices measuring crucial characteristics of multi‐actor regulatory arrangements: (i) the scope of organizational proliferation; (ii) the extent of coordination between regulatory actors; (iii) the amount of influence that each individual regulatory actor has on the sector regulation; and (iv) the extent to which the regulatory influence is concentrated in the hands of one or a few actors. We argue that our indices are sufficiently systematic, reliable, and flexible to be applied in a variety of research contexts relating to multi‐level and multi‐actor regulatory governance.

The existing literature explains the emergence of European regulatory networks through the need for regulatory coordination and the battle for power between policymakers. Bringing together the Europeanization and policy feedback perspectives, this article suggests that European regulatory networks should also be seen as the result of a more complex process of mutual influence between the European and the national levels. An in-depth case study on the telecommunications sector reveals that the implementation of EU policies has contributed to the empowerment of national regulatory agencies, which, in turn, has conditioned the development of European regulatory networks. EU policy has thus indirectly conditioned the rise of European regulatory networks by previously transforming national administrations. Besides expanding our understanding of European regulatory networks, by bridging the Europeanization and policy feedback literatures, this article indicates promising orientations for future theoretical development in both fields.

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While the widespread diffusion of experimentalism across sectors and polities is well documented, less is known about the extent of the shift to this non-hierarchical form of governance, which continues to coexist with traditional hierarchical governance and involves more inclusive rulemaking and revision based on review of alternative implementation experiences. By comparing and process-tracing electricity and telecommunications regulation in the European Union, we find diversity in experimentalism over time and across two sectors often considered similar. We explain varying degrees of experimentalism with strategic uncertainty and the constellation of preferences, which we label "de facto polyarchy." Thus, we confirm the emphasis on uncertainty documented in the experimentalist literature, while addressing a conventional critique by also highlighting the relevance of "politics." Moreover, while corroborating the common spread of experimentalism, we suggest that an analytical framework based on ideal types offers the best route forward to develop comparative analysis of experimentalism and non-hierarchical forms of governance more broadly.