Regulatory relationships across levels of multilevel governance systems: From collaboration to competition

Abstract

The European Union and the United States are paradigmatic examples of multilevel governance systems that are also regulatory states. In both settings, informal networks of regulators preceded and existed alongside supranational (federal) regulatory agencies. The literature understood their rationale as preparatory to the creation of higher level agencies. This approach, however, cannot explain why informal regulatory networks still exist, years after the establishment of higher level agencies. What explains the persistence of informal regulatory networks? The argument of this article is that in multilevel governance systems, the relationship between regulatory networks and the supranational level of governance is coevolutionary and embodies struggles for autonomy and authority: as the multilevel governance system consolidates, the character of this relationship evolves from collaborative to competitive. The argument relies on a comparative historical analysis of two voluntary networks of energy regulators from the European Union and the United States, based on 27 interviews and archival research.

Networks as First Best? Network Entrepreneurship and Venue Shifting in the Establishment of the Network of Euro–Mediterranean Energy Regulators

“…The literature retracing the establishment of regulatory networks usually underlines their functional rationale: given the interdependencies between a set of jurisdictions, collaboration within informal networks allows regulators to coordinate the details of policy implementation (Dehousse, ). This article corroborates the findings and arguments of the recent literature, which underline the political rationale of regulatory networks and the active role of regulators in shaping regulatory policy (Boeger and Corkin, ; Mathieu, ; Vantaggiato, ).…”

“…lack of decision‐making powers) is not an overly limiting factor: the expectation is that decision‐makers will consult the network in order to formulate policy. In the case at hand, European regulators were bolstered in this conviction by their experience of collaboration in the CEER, which became their channel of influence onto European energy regulatory policy (Vantaggiato, ). Leveraging their own bilateral relationships with both other European regulators and regulators in the European neighbourhood, the European regulators presented MedReg to the European Commission as a fait accompli, a ready‐made solution to a thorny policy issue.…”

“…Agenda‐setting implies the ability to select the issues that politicians will focus on (Polsby, ). The literature has found that regulators leverage their technical expertise and the information they obtain through their networks – which are not available to their political principals – to contribute into supranational and national policy‐making (Bach et al ., ; Boeger and Corkin, ; Vantaggiato, ). Thus, although it is informal (that is, devoid of decision‐making powers) a regulatory network can be highly consequential (Newman, ).…”

“…When CEER was established the European energy regulatory policy framework had just begun to develop. National regulators, through CEER, were an integral part of the policy process that led from the first energy package of 1996 (which did not mention regulation) to the ambitious third energy package of 2009 (which mandated member states to provide their regulators with independence from government and strong powers) (Vantaggiato, ).…”

The Robustness of National Agency Governance in Integrated Administrative Systems: Evidence from a large‐scale study

“…However, one challenge plaguing contemporary scholarship is how to understand the role of public agencies in the governing of a deeply integrated (yet differentiated) EU multilevel system. A recent review of EU agency literature (Egeberg and Jarle 2017) argued that few studies have examined how agencification at one level of governance affects public governance at another, and thus how shifting features of the state, such as agencification and subsequent networking of agencies, influence democratic governance (but see Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Egeberg 2006; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Vantaggiato 2019; Verhoest et al 2012). Whereas existing literature has mapped patterns of agencification, less is known of the actual role of national agencies in the multilevel policy‐making process in the EU generally, and how they navigate in conflicting choice architectures—such as those of domestic governments and EU‐level institutions.…”