Reifying mathematics? Prediction and symmetry classification

Bangu, Sorin

doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.09.003

Cited by 12 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Furthermore, physicists have formulated the theories as a result of conceptual (mathematical) work much before the posterior solid experimental support: see Bangu (2013Bangu ( , 2008 for the study of impressive historical cases, like the prediction of the Ω − boson. Moreover, it turns out that the gauge paradigm exhibits an appealing simplicity in that few inputs are required to specify full theories (Martin, 2003, p.53).…”

Section: Try Principles In Physicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fundamentality, Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries

Filomeno

2016

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Much recent philosophy of physics has investigated the process of symmetry breaking. Here, I critically assess the alleged symmetry restoration at the fundamental scale. I draw attention to the contingency that gauge symmetries exhibit, i.e. the fact that they have been chosen from among a countably infinite space of possibilities. I appeal to this feature of group theory to argue that any metaphysical account of fundamental laws that expects symmetry restoration up to the fundamental level is not fully satisfactory. This is a symmetry argument in line with Curie's 1 st principle. Further, I argue that this same feature of group theory helps to explain the "unreasonable" effectiveness of (this subfield of) mathematics in (this subfield of) physics, and that it reduces the philosophical significance that has been attributed to the objectivity of gauge symmetries.

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Section: Try Principles In Physicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fundamentality, Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries

Filomeno

2016

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Two Kinds of Discovery: An Ontological Account

Gilead

2020

Synthese Library

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What can we discover? As the discussion in this paper is limited to ontological considerations, it does not deal with the discovery of new concepts. It raises the following question: What are the entities or existents that we can discover? There are two kinds of such entities: (1) actual entities and (2) possible entities, which are pure possibilities. The paper explains why the first kind of discovery depends primarily on the second kind. The paper illustrates the discoveries of individual pure possibilities by presenting examples such as the Higgs particle, Dirac's positron, and Pauli-Fermi's neutrino.

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Structure and Applicability

Ginammi

2014

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

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Reifying mathematics? Prediction and symmetry classification

Cited by 12 publications

References 15 publications

Fundamentality, Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries

Fundamentality, Effectiveness, and Objectivity of Gauge Symmetries

Two Kinds of Discovery: An Ontological Account

Structure and Applicability

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