Rejection of Radical Nationalism in Wartime Yugoslavia: The Case of Tuzla (1990–1995)

Abstract

The article identifies causal mechanisms that help explain why the city of Tuzla managed to reject and avoid inter-ethnic conflict and radical nationalism during the wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. Despite the overwhelming odds of being surrounded by vicious ethnic fighting and relentless nationalist attacks, the city of Tuzla protected and sustained peace in its borders. This research provides some explanations as to why Tuzla managed to survive radical nationalism and fragmentation during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The article concludes that Tuzla's success was path dependent and its ability to reject violent nationalism revolved around Tuzla's identity of traditionally working class, anti-nationalist, anti-fascist forces around which Tuzla's citizens rallied. This helped elect the only non-ethnic political leadership in the country during the first multiparty municipal elections, and also actively protected citizens’ democratic choice against nationalist attempts to foster ethnic mobilisation and ethnic violence.

Critique of Instrumentalist and Primordialist Theories

“…This implies that the proponents of instrumentalism, in their intent to foster a micro level ethnic conflict, neglected to consider the anatomy of the local political leadership and that of civil society, as in the cities of Tuzla and Vares for example. Both municipalities voted along the non-ethnic political lines during the first multiparty elections and stood in direct contradiction to the instrumentalist assumption that all wars in Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia, were unquestioningly motivated by political elites (Armakolas, 2011;Filic, 2018). Hence the instrumentalist weakness is made apparent; its wide canvas brush assumption failed to identify instances where ethnic violence could possibly be rejected; as such instrumentalists failed to identify the formation, structure and composition of the local and regional civil structures.…”

“…(2011). The Paradox of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War and Filic, G. (2018). Rejection of Radical Nationalism in Wartime Yugoslavia: The Case of Tuzla (1990Tuzla ( -1995.…”

Inequality and welfare state clientelism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…6 The narrative of all three ethnic groups is that they were fighting The most recent initiative opposing these principles was the adoption of the RS Law on Victims of War Torture, intended to grant benefits to prisoners of war camps and victims of torture, including those that experienced sexual violence and rape. The law stipulates benefits only for RS residents whose status is approved by the Association of Women Victims of War of the Republika Srpska or/and the Association of Women Victims of War of the RS, which IneqUalIty anD Welfare State ClIentelISM In BoSnIa anD HerzegovIna a just war, i.e., defending their homes and families from those attacking them (Berdak 2013), and in their own eyes all three ethnicities, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, are at one and the same time both victims and heroes, depending on the type of social benefit they want to receive (Filic 2018).…”

“…The instrumentalisation of social policy for clientelistic purposes has been limited in western democracies due to well-functioning, impartial institutions with transparency, accountability, and active checks and balances built in to safeguard against corrupt practices. Additionally, robust political competition has ensured that no political party misuses power, whether to consolidate political influence, polarise the political environment, or consolidate ethnic-based or ideological instrumentalisation of the masses (Filic 2018). In post-Dayton BiH the public sector and state-owned enterprises and institutions play a dominant role in economic output.…”