Related party transactions and earnings management in Jordan: the role of ownership structure

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between related party transactions and both accrual and real earnings management practices in Jordanian industrial public-listed companies, taking into account the uniqueness of the Jordanian company ownership structure. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from Jordanian industrial public-listed companies for the period 2011–2017. Accrual earnings management is measured by using the modified Jones model, whereas real earnings management and related party transactions are measured by using relevant proxies. A regression model is developed and used to assess the relation between related party transactions and earnings management, taking into account the effects of ownership concentration, family ownership and institutional ownership levels of the companies involved. Findings Accrual earnings management is negatively associated with related party transactions. Regarding the role of ownership structure, the presence of institutional investors is positively associated with using both related party transactions and real earnings management, whereas ownership concentration plays an efficient role to mitigate the use of both accrual earnings management and related party transactions. No statistically significant relations between real earnings management and related party transactions exist. Practical implications This study has direct practical implications for the Jordanian regulatory authorities to enact regulations to limit the misuse of related party transactions and earnings management transactions and ensure sufficient monitoring of these transactions because of their prevalence. Jordanian companies should also enhance their corporate governance systems to better approve and monitor such transactions, including enhancing the role of independent and non-controlling board members in this process. Originality/value Related party transactions are considered as a major concern of financial reporting quality in developed countries, and such transactions are found to be relatively more problematic in developing countries, where corporate governance is generally weak, and there is limited disclosure and transparency in financial reporting. From this perspective, this study is one of the very few studies in developing countries that explore the issue of related party transactions and their association with earnings management practices. Thus, the findings of this study can arguably be to some extent generalized to other developing country contexts, because of relatively similar business environment conditions, and therefore potentially fill a gap represented by the paucity of similar studies in developing countries.

The impact of related parties’ trading on the listed company’s earnings management - evidence in Vietnam

“…The study has added an understanding of the interaction between RPTs and EM and the quality of audits that may affect this relationship. Alhadab et al (2020) negatively associated with RPTs. Regarding the role of ownership structure, the presence of institutional investors has a positive impact on the use of both RPTs and real EM, while ownership concentration plays an effi cient role to mitigate the use of both accrual EM and RPTs.…”

Abnormal real activities, meeting earnings targets and firms' future operating performance: evidence from an emerging economy

“…Abbadi et al, 2016;Alzoubi, 2016;Alzoubi, 2018;Idris et al, 2018) primarily focused on accrual-based earnings management. Others, such as Al-Haddad and Whittington (2019), and Alhadab et al (2020), have been confined to exploring the prospects of real earnings manipulations in Jordan. Nevertheless, a study exploring the influence of REM on future operating performance in Jordan and in the MENA region at large is virtually non-existent.…”

Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and Audit Fee: Conflicting Evidence from Iran

“…Gordon and Henry (2005) argue that when the main purpose of making a transaction with related parties is to gain access to their experience, expertise, and unique skills, managers no longer have a particular incentive to manipulate financial information, which in turn will reduce audit costs. To prove this claim, several studies have stated that there is a positive association between RPTs and financial reporting quality (El-Helaly et al 2018;Alhadab et al 2020). Nevertheless, "tunneling" or "conflict of interests transaction hypothesis" states that RPTs may lead to corporate failure because they exploit company resources due to existing conflictual interests (Pozzoli and Venuti 2014;Hendratama and Barokah 2020;.…”