Religious Regulation as Foreign Policy: Morocco's Islamic Diplomacy in West Africa

Abstract

Studies of religious regulation tend to examine how states manage the domestic religious market. This article extends this research program by analyzing a state that regulates the religious markets of foreign countries. The Moroccan case demonstrates the circumstances under which a religious bureaucracy designed to manage domestic religion can be turned outward, and employed to achieve foreign policy goals. Unlike other cases of foreign religious regulation, however, Morocco's efforts have been welcomed at the same time that the policy advanced Morocco's interests. What explains the success of Morocco's religious foreign policy? Building on interviews with religious elites from a recipient country, this article argues that Moroccan religious foreign policy has been successful because it was perceived as having historical and cultural legitimacy, it built on pre-existing institutions, and it was paired with renewed economic collaboration, three factors that have broader theoretical relevance to the study of religious foreign policies.

Turkey and African agency: the role of Islam and commercialism in Turkey's Africa policy

“…A distinctive aspect of Turkey's relationship with Africa, which sets Turkey apart from most of the other emerging powers engaging with the continent, is the use of religious references, namely the notion of Muslim kinship, aimed to develop closer relations with communities following the same faith. The use of Islam in foreign policy strategies aimed at the African continent is not unique to Turkey as other regional powers engaged with the continent have also used religious diplomacy in their approaches, such as Morocco's religious outreach to West Africa (Wainscott 2018), Iran's attempts to promote Shia Islam across the continent (Keynoush 2021) or Saudi Arabia's investments in religious education in sub-Saharan Africa (Mandaville & Hamid 2018: 9–10). Specifically, in Muslim-majority states of East Africa, such as Somalia or Sudan, Turkey presents itself much more than a friend, often framing the relationship in a fraternal way, emphasising the notion of brotherhood which is rooted in the Qur'an, most notably in the Verse of Brotherhood (49: 10) which says that ‘the believers are nothing else than brothers’.…”

“…For example, the Second Summit of African Muslim Religious Leaders hosted by Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs ( Diyanet ) in 2011 concluded that ‘educational institutions similar to the Imam-Hatip schools in Turkey should be used as an example for schools in Africa and backed with faculties providing higher religious education like [Turkey's] theology faculties’ (quoted in Hürriyet Daily News 2011). African concerns about the spread of Islamic extremism and a desire to promote a religious sphere structured in line with moderate readings of Islam can potentially provide the conditions for the pull factor of shared religion (M. Özkan 2014 a : 231; see also Wainscott 2018: 19).…”

Islam y política exterior: El caso de Marruecos

“…Este relato, ampliamente difundido, más allá de su dudosa precisión en términos históricos alimenta la percepción del soberano marroquí como una especie de "padre religioso" en la región. 66 Esta representación se ve reforzada también por la inclusión del nombre del soberano en las denominaciones del tejido de fundaciones e instituciones religiosas creadas por Marruecos durante la última década, muchas de ellas con actividad en el espacio subsahariano (Fundación Mohamed VI para la edición del Sagrado Corán, Instituto Mohamed VI de Lecturas y Estudios coránicos, Fundación Mohamed VI de Ulemas Africanos, Fundación Mohamed VI para promoción de las obras sociales y los empleados religiosos).…”

Moving Beyond Official Cultural Diplomacy: Unleashing the Potential of Moroccan Students as Unofficial Cultural Ambassadors

“…Again, this diplomacy was strongly determined by the political circumstances of the 9/11 events and was designed to "reposition itself geopolitically and raise its profile in relations with key Western allies on which Morocco's economy and security still largely depends" (Tadlaoui, 2015: 5). The Moroccan state also regulates, through its intelligence agencies, the religious market of foreign countries to achieve foreign policy goals (Wainscott, 2017). Not only that but festivals such as the Marrakech International Film Festival and the Mawazine music festival in Rabat are sponsored by the Moroccan state and have been used by the state as vehicles for promoting its cultural diplomacy (Dines, 2020).…”

“…As we have seen from the literature, Morocco's cultural diplomacy is politically oriented, and it emanates either from the authority of the monarchy or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This policy either uses Morocco's Islamic cultural heritage or Jewish heritage (Wainscott, 2017), or Moroccan diaspora in Europe (Kaya & Drhimeur, 2022), or Cinema and music festivals (Dines, 2020), or Sufi organizations such as Tijaniyya Brotherhood (Hernando de Larramendi, 2017). This means that Moroccan cultural diplomacy still works according to the principles of traditional or official cultural diplomacy and that the Moroccan state still depends heavily on the monarchy and the official institutions affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote its cultural image and soft power.…”