Remittances and bribery in Africa

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of remittances on bribe payments to public officials to access public goods and services in Africa. We argue that migrant remittances may affect bribery among remittance recipients through the income and norm channels. Using Afrobarometer surveys administered in thirty-six African countries between 2004 and 2016, we find that remittance receivers are more prone to bribe payment than non-receivers. More importantly, we find that individuals who live in countries with higher levels of remittances as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are more likely to pay bribes than individuals from countries with lower remittances as a share of GDP, which supports the income channel. However, the positive link between remittances and bribery diminishes in countries with a high level of control over corruption. When looking at the stock of migrants living abroad, we find that citizens from African countries that record a high stock of migrants living in OECD countries are less likely to pay bribe than citizens from African countries with lower level of stock of migrants in OECD countries. This finding is in line with the norm channel, but more data are needed for a better understanding of this mechanism.

Remittance dependence, support for taxation and quality of public services in Africa

“… 6 It may also well be that they use it for bribe payment to access public services. In line to this, a recent study by Konte and Ndubuisi (2020) showed among others, that remittance receivers are more prone to bribe payment than non-receivers.…”

“…Remittances underscore a closer link and communication between migrants and their loved ones that are left behind. Hence, remittance may serve as a conduit of internalized norms transfer or spillover from migrants to their loved ones either indirectly through communication and exchange, or directly as per when migrants inveigle their loved ones back home to comply with certain norms and beliefs by withholding transfer (Batista et al ., 2019; Konte and Ndubuisi, 2020; Levitt, 1998).…”

Do Remittances Contribute to Presidential Instability in Latin America?

“…Remittance recipients having greater perceptions of higher insecurity or corruption do not drive support for military coups. Remittance recipients are found to have different views and experiences with crime and corruption (López García and Maydom 2021b; Konte and Ndubuisi 2020). A series of interaction results with neighborhood insecurity, corruption perception, and crime victimization did not yield significant results (tables –).…”

“…Recent research find a statistical relationship between remittances and corruption but it is unclear as to whether international transfers help decrease or increase corruption (Abdih et al 2012; Ahmed 2013; Berdiev et al 2013; Tyburski 2012; 2014). Recipients can respond to greater corruption by voting out incumbents, disengaging from politics, or paying for the costs of corruption, such as bribery solicitations (Ahmed 2013; Konte and Ndubuisi 2020; Pfutze 2012; Tyburski 2014). However, it is unclear whether individual recipients will respond to corruption with antidemocratic preferences.…”

“…In a panel study of Mexican municipalities, remittances declined in places that observed in increase in crime (Meseguer et al 2017). Remittance recipients across African countries are more likely to pay bribes to local government officials for assistance and for public services (Konte and Ndubuisi 2020). Recipients may find themselves having to reduce their consumption to pay the costs of rising crime and corruption, which reduces the marginal benefits that stem from their remittances.…”