Rent-seeking in an emerging market: A DSGE approach

Junior, Celso José Costa; García-Cintado, Alejandro

doi:10.1016/j.ecosys.2020.100775

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Costa & Garcia-Cintado [11] developed and applied a DSGE model to calculate the natural rent generated by extracting enterprises in Brazil.…”

Section: Corporate Income Tax Taxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxes and Customs Duties as Instruments for Extracting Oil Rent into the State Budget: The Case of Russia

Fedotov,

Burov

2024

JTR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For countries focused on the extraction and processing of natural resources, including Russia, a crucial task is to ensure the rational extraction and distribution of natural rent. The tax model applied to natural rent should facilitate its optimal allocation to the budget without undermining the motivation of resource users to invest. This study seeks to gauge the extent of oil rent extraction into the Russian budget and suggest strategies to enhance the efficacy of redistributing oil rent to the state budget. Our hypothesis proposes that export customs duties, compared to the mineral extraction tax, prove more effective in achieving the desired redistribution from resource users to the budget. To assess the extent of oil rent extraction, we devised a methodology based on calculating the oil rent generated in Russia. This method involves measuring the difference between the income generated by the oil industry and the total expenses incurred by oil sector companies. Our analysis reveals that, from 2005 to 2022, up to 87% of the oil rent generated in Russia was extracted through rent payments to the state budget. However, in recent years, the degree of oil rent extraction has decreased to 56%. This decline can be attributed to the tax maneuver initiated in Russia since 2015, entailing a reduction and eventual elimination of export customs duties, coupled with an increase in the mineral extraction tax rate. Our results indicate a diminishing effectiveness of rent-based taxation in Russia due to the reduced fiscal significance of rent payments. Furthermore, their regulatory function, designed to incentivize taxpayers for investment contributions, has weakened. These findings offer valuable insights for shaping fiscal policies and lay the groundwork for further research in this domain.

show abstract

“…Costa & Garcia-Cintado [11] developed and applied a DSGE model to calculate the natural rent generated by extracting enterprises in Brazil.…”

Section: Corporate Income Tax Taxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxes and Customs Duties as Instruments for Extracting Oil Rent into the State Budget: The Case of Russia

Fedotov,

Burov

2024

JTR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moreover, states with established democratic institutions and a high level of economic wealth create instruments and procedures to control the political class and punish corrupt politicians [23]. On the other hand, weak institutions play an important role in the pro-cyclicality of rent-seeking [24].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Corruption and Rent-Seeking Behavior upon Economic Wealth in the European Union from a Public Choice Approach

Dincă

Negri

et al. 2021

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The current paper evaluates the impact of corruption and rent-seeking behaviors upon economic wealth in the European Union states using a public choice approach. The period of study is 2000 to 2019. To measure this impact, the present study uses a regression with variables reflecting governance quality and considered relevant, from a public choice approach, to corruption and rent-seeking. The main results of this study show a negative relationship between the level of corruption and economic wealth for all analyzed countries, especially for the ones that compose the new member states group. For all the EU member states, the variables capturing governance quality seem to have a positive impact on economic wealth. The higher levels of governance performance, synonymous with lower levels of rent-seeking, personal interest, and political pressures on state administrations, contribute to economic wealth, as public choice theory emphasizes. There is a need for reform and an increase in the efficiency of public institutions, especially in new member states.

show abstract

“…However, there have been a large number of cases in the research of other product and service quality regulation strategies, including the construction of mixed game strategies and regulation strategies under diferent conditions, which provide a wealth of cases and suggestions for the government. For example, Tanner [14], Konefal and Hatanaka [15], Junna [16], Du et al [17], Celso and Alejandro [18], and Liu et al [19] are all concerned about food safety. Evolutionary game studies have been carried out in such felds as product introduction, multipayment, energy enterprises, DSGE method, and illegal mining enterprises, but there are few research studies on the quality safety strategy of intelligent buildings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

Yang

She

Guo

2023

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The “14th Five-Year” development plan of the construction industry of the Chinese government makes it clear that intelligent buildings are the general direction of future construction development. However, the occurrence of construction accidents in recent years has brought huge casualties. With the rapid development of third-party inspection institutions, their judgment has become an important threshold for the access to smart buildings. The failure of inspection institutions to detect the renewal of leases may lead to the failure of intelligent systems, leading to the failure of construction equipment and causing major safety accidents such as the uncontrolled fall of construction elevators and the fall of tower crane items. As the supervisor of third-party inspection institutions, government functional departments are responsible for the failure of intelligent systems. All of them undertake the important role of intelligent building security. This paper builds an evolutionary game model with government regulatory authorities, third-party testing institutions, and intelligent construction enterprises as the three game parties, based on variables that affect the factors of the players, and discusses the possible scenarios of the stabilization strategy, which draws the following points: (1) the increase of incentives and penalties by the government is conducive to promoting the construction of high-quality intelligent buildings and the normative behavior of the third party without intention to seek rent, but the increase of incentives will not be conducive to the government fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities. (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is greater than their speculative returns so as to ensure the safety of intelligent buildings in the evolving and stable market environment. (3) The accountability of the superior government for the dereliction of duty of the regulatory authorities is of great significance to enhancing the stability of enterprises in building high-quality intelligent buildings. (4) It is also an effective way to avoid the construction of low-quality smart buildings by improving the listed sales income of enterprises and increasing the rent-seeking cost of enterprises. Combined with the improved SIR model, it is calculated that after the occurrence of a construction accident, when the rumor first appears, the rumor will quickly spread out of control without timely management and supervision. The conclusion of the game model provides a great reference value for the government’s regulatory behavior. The quality of the government’s regulatory behavior is directly related to the future of high-quality development of intelligent construction and also expands the application field of evolutionary game theory and SIR theory. The government should actively manage third-party testing institutions and intelligent building enterprises before construction accidents happen. After the accident, strict management and supervision should be carried out on well-known bloggers before the emergence of rumors so as to reduce the possibility of standardizing individuals’ reprinting of rumors and avoid the uncontrollable negative impact in the later period, thus seriously affecting the credibility of government supervision.

show abstract

Rent-seeking in an emerging market: A DSGE approach

Cited by 9 publications

References 25 publications

Taxes and Customs Duties as Instruments for Extracting Oil Rent into the State Budget: The Case of Russia

Taxes and Customs Duties as Instruments for Extracting Oil Rent into the State Budget: The Case of Russia

The Impact of Corruption and Rent-Seeking Behavior upon Economic Wealth in the European Union from a Public Choice Approach

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About