Repetition and depth of processing

Nelson, Thomas O.

doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(77)80044-3

Cited by 207 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…An explanation for this could be that as participants were given another opportunity to process the information, they were able to do so in a slower, more logical way using system 2 rather than the fast and intuitive system 1 (Kahneman, 2011), supporting suggestions by previous researchers that deeper and more complex processing can occur if the opportunity is given (e.g. Nelson, 1977;Obermiller, 1985;Smith & DeCoster 2000). The results also showed that participants did not use the population statistics when the conjunction subject was an atheist and therefore committed the conjunction fallacy, indicated by the lack of significant difference between types of information (see figure 6).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 53%

“…Repetition of a question can also have an impact on decision making, by providing people with the opportunity to process information at a deeper level (Nelson, 1977). Smith and DeCoster (2000) suggest that when motivated and given enough time, people can think deeply about a task, and may come up with a qualitatively different answer to what they would come up with using a "quick and dirty" approach, which can again be related to the distinction between system 1 and 2 processing described by Kahneman (2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Giddings

Dunn

2015

The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion

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Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual's anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. 100 participants from the UK completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual's identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of antiatheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.3

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 53%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Giddings

Dunn

2015

The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion

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“…It is now well established that when people process material shallowly-at a perceptual, rote, or nonsemantically informed level-their memory is worse than if they process it deeply, meaningfully, or semantically (Cermak & Craik, 1979;Craik & Lockhart, 1972;Craik & Tulving, 1975), although the explanation for this levels-of-processing effect is still debated (Baddeley, 1978;Metcalfe, 1985Metcalfe, , 1997Nelson, 1977). Memory is critically dependent on people's having a schematic framework providing the deep meaning for the material without which memory performance deteriorates.…”

Section: Meaningful Elaborative Multimodal Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A cognitive-science based programme to enhance study efficacy in a high and low risk setting

Metcalfe

Kornell

Son

2007

European Journal of Cognitive Psychology

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In three experiments, learning performance in a 6-or 7-week cognitive-science based computer-study programme was compared to equal time spent self-studying on paper. The first two experiments were conducted with grade 6 and 7 children in a high risk educational setting, the third with Columbia University undergraduates. The principles the programme implemented included (1) deep, meaningful, elaborative, multimodal processing, (2) transfer-appropriate processing, (3) selfgeneration and multiple testing of responses, and (4) spaced practice. The programme was also designed to thwart metacognitive illusions that would otherwise lead to inappropriate study patterns. All three experiments showed a distinct advantage in final test performance for the cognitive-science based programme, but this advantage was particularly prominent in the children.A basic foundation for school accomplishment is the availability of higher order cognitive and metacognitive competencies to realistically assess one's knowledge, to allocate and organise study time and effort optimally, to apply cognitive principles (such as deep, elaborative rehearsal, self-generation, testing, and spacing of practice, to name just a few) that effectively enhance learning, and to resist the distractions that could undermine even the most sincerely endorsed intentions. In the population that we targeted in this research, a population of middle school children in an at-risk school setting, these competencies were strikingly limited. Their enhancement was the primary objective of this research. In addition, even among sophisticated learners, specific limitations exist in the use of certain metacognitive strategies. Children and adults often think they know things when they do not (see Metcalfe, 1998;Rawson & Dunlosky, 2007 this issue), and hence inappropriately terminate self-controlled study efforts, or otherwise study in a manner that fails to optimise learning (Bjork, 1994). We sought to devise a computerassisted study programme, based on principles of cognitive science, that would allow such metacognitive illusions to be overcome.The project reported here focused on memory enhancing principles derived from experimental studies in cognitive science. Most of these principles, because they have been studied primarily with a focus on understanding the mechanisms underlying memory and cognition, rather than on efforts to facilitate children's academic success, have been investigated in single-session experiments with scholastically irrelevant materials with college-student participants. Despite the apparent lack of connection of this cognitive science literature to real problems that children Correspondence should be addressed to Janet Metcalfe,

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“…Although the results of these studies have generally confirmed the predictions of the "levels" position and its variants in terms of memory for prose, there have been several cogent criticisms of the "levels" perspective (e.g., Baddeley, 1978;Nelson, 1977;Postman, Thompkins, & Gray, 1978). Among the several critics of the "levels" perspective, however, Morris, Bransford, and Franks (1977) have presented the most clearly articulated alternative, transferappropriate-processing.…”

mentioning

confidence: 63%

Memory for Sentences and Prose: Levels-of-Processing or Transfer-Appropriate-Processing?

Glover

Rankin

Langner

et al. 1985

Journal of Reading Behavior

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Four experiments were conducted in order to contrast the levels-of-processing perspective with the transfer-appropriate-processing perspective. Experiment 1 employed a within-groups design to contrast the effects of various types of questions at different positions on subjects' recognition of sentences. The results seemed to support the transfer-appropriate-processing perspective's predictions but were confounded by the form of design. Experiment 2 examined the same questions with a between-groups design, while Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 with the use of a free recall posttest. The results of both Experiments 2 and 3 seemed to support the predictions of the transferappropriate-processing perspective and disconfirm the predictions of the levels-of-processing framework. Experiment 4 extended the work to subjects' memory for paragraphs. The results of Experiment 4, however, did not match the pattern observed in Experiments 1-3 and, instead, seemed to bear out the predictions of the levels-of-processing perspective. The results are discussed in terms of the influence of experimental design, choice of study materials, choice of dependent variables, and their interaction.

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Repetition and depth of processing

Cited by 207 publications

References 66 publications

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

A cognitive-science based programme to enhance study efficacy in a high and low risk setting

Memory for Sentences and Prose: Levels-of-Processing or Transfer-Appropriate-Processing?

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