Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America

Abstract

Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that constitutions are replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing environments. According to this perspective, constitutions are likely to be replaced when constitutional crises are frequent, when political actors lack the capacity to implement changes by means of amendments or judicial interpretation, or when the constitutional regime has a power‐concentrating design. It is further argued that the frequency of amendments depends both on the length and detail of the constitution and on the interaction between the rigidity of the amendment procedure and the fragmentation of the party system. The article provides statistical evidence to support these arguments and discusses the normative implications of the analysis.

Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change: Lessons from Latin America

“…*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01. 53 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009;Negretto 2012. In line with the findings of Elkins et al we find that judicial review per se does not extend the life of constitutions. However, Model 2.1 indicates that the odds of constitutional replacement decline when a separate constitutional tribunal exercises this role (p < 0.05).…”

“…29 Elkins, Ginsburg, andLevitsky andMurillo 2013. 30 Elkins, Ginsburg, andLutz 1994;Negretto 2008;Negretto 2012. 31 Dahl 1971Elster 1995.…”

Democratic Constitutional Change: Assessing Institutional Possibilities

“…Perhaps these cautionary tales should not surprise, since constituent assemblies are usually not called in times of political calm and citizen satisfaction with government; they tend rather to be products of crises of governance of one form or another (Negretto 2012 ). But Iceland's recent experience with a constituent assembly-one born out of the deeply impactful 2008 fi nancial crisis-shows that, when suitably designed and taking advantage of the latest forms of communications technology, such assemblies can evince real improvements in both inclusive sensitivity and reasons -responsiveness .…”

Procesos constituyentes y refundación democrática: El caso de Chile en perspectiva comparada

“…Sobre este caso, ver Negretto (2012 El referendo parte de una concepción unitaria y homogénea del pueblo que como tal solo es capaz de adoptar decisiones binarias por medio del principio de mayoría. Por ello ocurre que esta forma de participación, si es usada en exclusividad o de manera central, es poco conducente a la deliberación pública necesaria para formar preferencias informadas en torno a la nueva constitución.…”