Replication Processes in Human Memory and Learning

Bernbach, Harley A.

doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60400-4

Cited by 21 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…This is not true for the research reviewed here. Its conclusions are sufficiently counterintuitive to be inconsistent with several popular approaches to memory (e.g., Bembach, 1969;Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Moreover, even the most basic fact about maintenance rehearsal, namely, that it is a less effective method of studying for recall than elaborative rehearsal, may not be obvious to sophisticated laypeople.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Effects of maintenance rehearsal on human memory.

Greene

1987

Psychological Bulletin

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There has been a conflict among several theories of memory as to whether the duration of the rehearsal of an item is necessarily related to its long-term retention. This conflict has centered on the question of whether rote rehearsal intended solely to maintain an item in awareness will lead to an increase in long-term-memory performance for that item. This question has been addressed with a variety of paradigms and has been answered in several ways. A review of the literature suggests that the duration of maintenance rehearsal affects the memory trace chiefly by increasing self-coding (item information) and that, consequently, its effects tend to be more evident on recognition than on recall tests.Research in psychology too often fails into a predictable pattern. A phenomenon is reported and excites great interest Experimentation on this phenomenon is carried on feverishly for a period of time. Then interest in it tapers off, usually without any firm conclusions being reached. On the surface, one might see this pattern exemplified by the study of the long-term effects on memory of maintenance rehearsal. Research on this topic was carried on quite heavily in the 1970s, and it seems to be lessening today. I argue, however, that the research on maintenance rehearsal was not in vain but rather established empirical principles of considerable importance.It is easy to trace the beginning of modern research on maintenance rehearsal. Waugh and Norman (1965) placed great emphasis on the role of rehearsal in transferring information into permanent storage in memory. By rehearsal, they meant the "recall of a verbal item-either immediate or delayed, silent or overt, deliberate or involuntary" (Waugh & Norman, 1965, p. 92). (for a discussion of the definition of the term rehearsal and of the ways in which this term has been used by memory researchers, see Johnson, 1980, andPeynircioglu, 1982.) Waugh and Norman (1965) went on to claim, "Rehearsal transferred a recently perceived verbal item from one memory store to another more commodious store from which it can be retrieved at a much later time" (p. 92). Following James (1890), Waugh and Norman called these stores primary memory and secondary memory.Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) developed their own highly influential multistore model of memory. As in the Waugh and Norman (1965) model, rehearsal was responsible for the transfer of information between primary and secondary memory (or, as Atkinson and Shiffrin called them, short-term store and longterm store). Rehearsal served this function at least in part simply by maintaining information in the short-term store. As Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) noted, "Throughout the period that information resides in the short-term store transfer takes place to long-term store" (p.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Effects of maintenance rehearsal on human memory.

Greene

1987

Psychological Bulletin

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“…In a famous passage in the Theaetetus concerning the nature of knowledge and the possibility of false judgment, Plato ascribes to Socrates the following statements (translated by Hamilton, 1961, p. 897): "Imagine, then, for the sake of argument, that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is comparatively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of just the right consistency .... Let us Table I A. Spatial Analogies With Search wax tablet (Plato, Aristotle) gramophone (pear, 1922) aviary (pIato) house (James, 1890) rooms in a house (Freud, 1924(Freud, /1952 switchboard (see John, 1972) purse (G. A. Miller, 1956) leaky bucket or sieve (G. A. Miller, 1956) junk box (G. A. Miller, 1963) bottle (G. A. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) computer program (Simon & Feigenbaum, 1964) stores (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) mystic writing pad (Freud, 1940(Freud, /1950 workbench (Klatzky, 1975) cow's stomach (Hintzman, 1974) pushdown stack (Bernbach, 1969) acid bath (posner & Konick, 1966) library (Broadbent, 1971) dictionary (Loftus, 1977) keysort cards (Brown & McNeill, 1966) conveyer belt (Murdock, 1974) tape recorder (see Posner & Warren, 1972) subway map (Collins & Quillian, 1970) garbage can (Landauer, 1975) B. Other Spatial Theories organization theory (Tulving, 1962) hierarchical networks (G. Mandler, 1967) associative networks (Anderson & Bower, 1973) C. Other Analogies muscle ("strength") (Woodworth, 1929) construction (Bartlett, 1932) reconstruction of a dinosaur (Neisser, 1967) levels of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) signal detection (Bernbach, 196...…”

Section: Spatial Analogies With Searchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory metaphors in cognitive psychology

1980

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In describing memory phenomena in natural language, a spatial metaphor is typically employed. Memories are considered to be objects that are stored in a mind space, and the process of retrieval is conceived as a search for these objects. It is argued that this metaphor has been carried over into many of the popular theories of memory in cognitive psychology and that seemingly diverse theories employ the same underlying set of assumptions. A survey of the analogies that have been used to explain memory is presented and alternatives to the dominant spatial storage and search assumptions are discussed. The spatial metaphor is evaluated, and the role of analogical explanation in psychology is briefly considered. One result of the increasing number of analogical models is the proliferation of hypothetical mental constructs that are only loosely connected to behavioral measures. COMMON CONCEPTIONS OF MIND Jaynes (1976) puts forth the remarkable thesis that subjective consciousness has evolved only in the last

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“…Some years ago, Bernbach (1967) and Kintsch (1967) proposed models for recognition memory that combined the assumption of only a few discrete states of memory with that of continuous distributions of "apparent oldness" or "familiarity," on which a decision process operates. These models enjoy some popularity, particularly since some of the more comprehensive theories of memory, such as those of Bernbach (1970), Kintsch (1970b), andAnderson andBower (1972), reduce to them under suitable conditions. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly claimed (e.g., Kintsch, 1970a; that highthreshold models of recognition memory are rejected by the known experimental findings.…”

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confidence: 99%

A testable property of some discrete-state models for recognition memory.

Vorberg¹,

Schmidt²

1975

Psychological Review

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Several current theories of recognition memory combine the notion of a few discrete states of memory with the assumption of continuous distributions of familiarity or apparent oldness. If a test for threshold theories of signal detection proposed by Krantz is applied, it can be shown that the discrete-state memory models imply a lower bound on the a posteriori curve obtained from confidence ratings in yes-no recognition experiments. From this the prediction is derived that new items cannot be perfectly recognized as new unless the forgetting probability is zero. Experimental data are presented that show this prediction to be wrong. Some years ago, Bernbach (1967) and Kintsch (1967) proposed models for recognition memory that combined the assumption of only a few discrete states of memory with that of continuous distributions of "apparent oldness" or "familiarity," on which a decision process operates. These models enjoy some popularity, particularly since some of the more comprehensive theories of memory, such as those of Bernbach (1970), Kintsch (1970b), andAnderson andBower (1972), reduce to them under suitable conditions. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly claimed (e.g., Kintsch, 1970a; that highthreshold models of recognition memory are rejected by the known experimental findings. These claims seemingly were reinforced by Krantz's (1969) article, which presents an important empirical test for threshold theories of signal detection. What seems to have been overlooked in recent research on recognition memory is that both the Bernbach and the Kintsch models can be regarded as generalized high-threshold models and consequently can be subjected to the same critical test.

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Replication Processes in Human Memory and Learning

Cited by 21 publications

References 29 publications

Effects of maintenance rehearsal on human memory.

Effects of maintenance rehearsal on human memory.

Memory metaphors in cognitive psychology

A testable property of some discrete-state models for recognition memory.

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