Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets

Abstract

We study the impact of providing school report cards with test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent, and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school test scores is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, and improves market efficiency and child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment, and lower fees. (JEL D83, H75, I21, I28, O15, O18)

Can Public Rankings Improve School Performance?

“…The pass rate for these schools improved by 5.7 percentage points (or 36 percent relative to the pre-BRN pass rate among bottom decile schools), and on average two additional students from each of these schools passed the PSLE-a 24 percent increase relative to the pre-BRN number of passing students for bottom decile schools. Our estimated effect sizes for the bottom decile schools are similar to the experimental estimate of distributing school report cards in Pakistan (Andrabi et al, 2017).…”

“…Given parents' minimal awareness of the rankings and limited scope for school choice, this suggests that top-down pressure and bureaucratic reputational incentives are capable of driving learning improvements. This is a novel finding, given that the existing literature on school ranking interventions has only showed these to be effective when there is sufficient school choice or high-stakes consequences (Andrabi et al, 2017;Figlio and Loeb, 2011;Hastings and Weinstein, 2008;Koning and Van der Wiel, 2013;Nunes et al, 2015).…”

“…As a result, the first accountability systems that are implemented tend to be "low-stakes" systems that simply focus on publicizing information about school performance. 1 Although successful low-stakes accountability reforms have taken place in contexts when parents are willing and able to act on the information provided to them (Andrabi et al, 2017;Camargo et al, 2018; Koning and van der Wiel, 2012), these systems may also be effective if they create sufficient reputational pressure for higher-level education administrators or school staff (Bruns et al, 2011; Figlio and Loeb, 2011). But such pressure could be a double-edged sword, encouraging the same distortions and perverse behaviors that are associated with high-stakes systems.In this paper, we study the intended and unintended consequences of a nationwide accountability system implemented in Tanzania in 2012.…”

The Role of the Private Sector in Providing Basic Education Services in Kasoa, Ghana

“…For example, evidence from Pakistan shows that school report cards can improve learning by 4 These estimates are based on the comparative operating costs of public and private schools in Kasoa, Ghana. 0.1 standard deviations and reduce fees by almost 20 percent. The largest learning gains were for initially lowperforming (below median baseline test scores) private schools (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009). Private school associations could play a key role in developing partnerships between government and private schools.…”

The impact of an accountability intervention with diagnostic feedback: Evidence from Mexico

“…The experimental evidence for India presented in Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) shows that a program that provided low-stakes diagnostic tests and feedback to teachers had no effect on student learning outcomes. In a randomized study in Punjab, Pakistan, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2014) show that providing test scores to households and schools leads to increases in subsequent test scores by 0.11 standard deviations after one year of the intervention. Test score gains in public schools were in response to a low-stakes threat since there were no formal consequences attached to results.…”