Representation and the Meaning of Life

Christensen, Wayne; Hooker, C. A.

doi:10.1016/b978-008044394-2/50006-3

Cited by 25 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Using this temporal approach, mental states and properties get their semantics in a formal manner in the temporal traces describing past and future interaction with the external world, in accordance with what is proposed informally by, e.g., (Bickhard, 1993(Bickhard, , 2000Christensen and Hooker, 2000;Clark, 1997). In relation on the view on wide content of mental state properties as relational specifications, as put forward in (Kim, 1996), pp.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…include the dynamical systems approach, and the interactionist perspective; cf. (Port and van Gelder, 1995;Bickhard, 1993Bickhard, , 2000Christensen and Hooker, 2000). In line with these, in this paper the dynamic and interactivist perspective is adopted.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…' This suggests that mental states need to be grounded in interaction histories on the one hand, and have to be related to future interactions on the other hand. No formalisation is proposed in the recent literature on the interactivist perspective on cognition such as (Bickhard, 1993(Bickhard, , 2000Christensen and Hooker, 2000). In literature such as (Port and Van Gelder, 1995) on the dynamical systems approach, modelling techniques based on algebraic and difference or differential equations between continuous numerical variables are commonly used.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Bickhard, 1993(Bickhard, , 2000Clark, 1997Clark, , 1999Kelso, 1995;Port and Van Gelder, 1995;Christensen and Hooker, 2000). For example, Bickhard (1993) emphasises the relation between the (mental) state of a system (or agent) and it's past and future in the interaction with its environment:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A temporal-interactivist perspective on the dynamics of mental states

Jonker

Treur

2003

Cognitive Systems Research

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This paper addresses the dynamics of mental states in relation to the dynamics of the interaction with the external world. It contributes a formalised temporal-interactivist approach to these dynamics based on temporal traces for semantics and on a temporal trace language to provide an expressive means to formulate dynamic properties. The approach provides both a foundation for the dynamical and interactivist perspective on cognitive phenomena.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A temporal-interactivist perspective on the dynamics of mental states

Jonker

Treur

2003

Cognitive Systems Research

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“…The circle closes by considering meaning (representational content) as a prerequisite for the maintenance of system's autonomy during its interaction. Moreover, the notion of representation is central to almost all theories of cognition, therefore being directly and indirectly connected with fundamental problems in the design of artificial cognitive agents [2], at the pure cognitivistic framework as much as at the embodied and dynamic approaches [3]. Although an embodied agent seems to be able to handle very simple tasks with only primitive stimulus-response actions, its cognitive capabilities cannot scale to tackle more complex phenomena.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Representational Autonomy of Agents in Artificial Environments

Arnellos

Vosinakis

Spyrou

et al. 2006

Advances in Artificial Intelligence

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Abstract. Autonomy is a crucial property of an artificial agent. The type of representational structures and the role they play in the preservation of an agent's autonomy are pointed out. A framework of self-organised Peircean semiotic processes is introduced and it is then used to demonstrate the emergence of grounded representational structures in agents interacting with their environment. Autonomy and Representations in Strong AgencyThere is an interesting interdependence between the three fundamental properties of interactivity, intentionality and autonomy which are used to describe an agent. As it is suggested in [1], there is no function without autonomy, no intentionality without function and no meaning without intentionality. The circle closes by considering meaning (representational content) as a prerequisite for the maintenance of system's autonomy during its interaction. Moreover, the notion of representation is central to almost all theories of cognition, therefore being directly and indirectly connected with fundamental problems in the design of artificial cognitive agents [2], at the pure cognitivistic framework as much as at the embodied and dynamic approaches [3]. Although an embodied agent seems to be able to handle very simple tasks with only primitive stimulus-response actions, its cognitive capabilities cannot scale to tackle more complex phenomena. These and other problems are evidences that the use of representations, even in reflexive behaviors, becomes essential [4]. However, representations should not be generic, context-free and predetermined, but they should be an emergent product of the interaction between an agent and its environment [2]. Emergent Representations via Self-organised Semiotic ProcessesSelf-organised and embodied systems admit no functional usefulness to representations. Based on the abovementioned, the incorporation of a process to support the vehicle of the representation which carries internal information about an external state seems imperative. This process should give the interactive dimension to the self-organising system and furthermore, it should correspond to the embedded structure of emergent representations. Peircean semiosis [5] can be seen as the process which drives the system into meaningful interaction. In the proposed framework, intelligence is not considered as an extra module, but as an asset emerging from the agent's functionality for interaction and the aim is the unification of the modality of interaction, perception and action with the smallest possible number of representational primitives. The present attempt is in correspondence with contemporary works in AI, such as [6] and [7]. In the present paper, there is an attempt to design a more generic architecture which will integrate aspects of self-organisation and embodiment with Peircean semiotics. There is in no way a demonstration of a totally autonomous system, but the introduced architecture overcomes the symbol-grounding

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A Modelling Environment for Mind and Matter Aspects of Intentional Behaviour

Jonker

Treur

Wijngaards

2002

From Theory to Practice in Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract. In this paper the internal dynamics of mental states, in particular states based on beliefs, desires and intentions, is formalised using a temporal language. A software environment is presented that can be used to specify, simulate and analyse temporal dependencies between mental states in relation to traces of them. If also relevant data on internal physical states over time are available, these can be analysed with respect to their relation to mental states.

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Representation and the Meaning of Life

Cited by 25 publications

References 13 publications

A temporal-interactivist perspective on the dynamics of mental states

A temporal-interactivist perspective on the dynamics of mental states

Towards Representational Autonomy of Agents in Artificial Environments

A Modelling Environment for Mind and Matter Aspects of Intentional Behaviour

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