Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience

Abstract

It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called ''self-representational approach to consciousness,'' is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called ''transparency of experience,'' frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

“…According to this view, the phenomenal contents subjectively experienced are fully transparent, meaning that they give only the impression of being actual patterns, objects or scenes out there in the physical world rather than some sort of transparent surrogates (or virtual simulations) of these things in the physical world that they are representative of [373]. The system (brain and consequently the subject) cannot distinguish the surrogate of the object from the object itself; it just "looks through" the surrogate as if it is the real physical object itself in the world 53 [375][376][377][378][379]. Thus, the whole phenomenal world (space together with contents) is a transparent surrogate of the physical world somehow realized in the brain.…”

Relevance or ‘relevate’? How university business schools can add value through reflexively learning from strategic partnerships with business

“…Indirect learning is grounded in a triadic relationship that integrates double loop learning theory (Argyris, 1977(Argyris, , 2002(Argyris, , 2003 with the expansion of peripheral awareness (Gennaro, 2008) through reflexively learning in experience (Cunliffe and Easterby-Smith, 2004). It encourages enquiry, challenge and reflexivity to bring about new perceptions and understanding.…”

“…'Practical reflexivity means unsettling conventional practices' (Cunliffe and Easterby-Smith, 2004: 31) so that hitherto unthought avenues of possibilities can come into decisional consideration. Such challenges lead to the development of the capacity for relevation, whereby ideas, events and happenings previously unconsidered are brought into the domain of consciousness through novel connections (Gennaro, 2008). This indirect approach empowers practitioners to discuss, challenge, negotiate and reframe shared experiences.…”

Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap

“…Coleman's transparency thesis is thus stronger than the one famously embraced by Moore (1903), who held that while we are usually not conscious of our own consciousness, but rather only of its objects, consciousness itself can be distinguished if we look attentively enough. Coleman's transparency thesis is also stronger than those embraced by other proponents of the HOT theory, such as Rosenthal (1997) and Gennaro (2008), who deny that ordinary, non-introspective consciousness involves peripheral conscious meta-awareness while holding that in introspection we become aware of our awareness. Coleman (2017, p. 280, fn.…”