Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent

Rigoni, Adam

doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9216-7

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…I first recall some notions concerning factors and cases often used in AI & law (e.g. by Horty (2011), Horty andBench-Capon (2012), Rigoni (2018) and Horty (2019)), although with some differences in notation. Let o and o ′ be two outcomes and Pro and Con be two disjoint sets of propositions called, respectively, the pro-and con factors, i.e., the factors favouring, respectively, outcome o and o ′ .…”

Section: Notationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although Horty (2020) presents a revision of his reason model that does not collapse into his result model, it shares a feature with his original model (which is even more strongly present in Rigoni's 2018 model) which raises some concerns about practical applicability. For these reasons I will first formally reconstruct Rigoni's (2018) model for so-called complete dimensions and then present an alternative which, although less expressive than Horty's and Rigoni's reaosn models, is arguably easier to apply in practice.…”

Section: Adapting the Approach To Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How can precedential constraint then be defined? If for each relevant value assignment in a case it is known which side is favoured by it, that is, if each such assignment is turned into a factor, then this is relatively easy, by combining ideas of Rigoni (2018) and Horty (2019). As a matter of fact, neither of these papers contains such a combination, although it seems implicitly assumed by Rigoni.…”

Section: A Reason Model With Dimensions With Switching Points and Incmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, I will investigate to which extent the difference between absence of factors and negated factors is relevant in Horty's factor-based models of precedential constraint. Third, I will present a full formalisation of Rigoni's (2018) dimension-based account of precedential constraint with 'complete' dimensions. I will then go on to present my final main contribution, in the form of an alternative to Rigoni's and Horty's dimension-based accounts of precedential constraint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A formal analysis of some factor- and precedent-based accounts of precedential constraint

Prakken

2021

Artif Intell Law

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In this paper several recent factor- and dimension-based models of precedential constraint are formally investigated and an alternative dimension-based model is proposed. Simple factor- and dimension-based syntactic criteria are identified for checking whether a decision in a new case is forced, in terms of the relevant differences between a precedent and a new case, and the difference between absence of factors and negated factors in factor-based models is investigated. Then Horty’s and Rigoni’s recent dimension-based models of precedential constraint are critically examined. An alternative to their reason models is proposed which is less expressive but arguably easier to apply in practice.

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Section: Notationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Adapting the Approach To Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Reason Model With Dimensions With Switching Points and Incmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A formal analysis of some factor- and precedent-based accounts of precedential constraint

Prakken

2021

Artif Intell Law

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“…As discussed in[20], several of the systems use dimensions, which have magnitudes and range from an extreme pro-plaintiff point to an extreme pro-defendant point, rather than factors. For simplicity we will just use factors (which can be regarded as particular points or ranges on a dimension[101]).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Before and after Dung: Argumentation in AI and Law

Bench‐Capon

2020

AAC

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Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks have had a very significant role in the rise in interest in argumentation throughout this century. In this paper we will explore the impact of this seminal idea on a specific application domain, AI and Law. Argumentation is central to legal reasoning and there had been a considerable amount of work on it in AI and Law before Dung's paper. It had, however, been rather fragmented. We argue that the abstract argumentation frameworks had a unifying effect by offering a means of relating previously diverse work. We also discuss how the particular demands of legal systems have led to developments building on the basic notions of abstract argumentation.

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Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint

Broughton

2019

Artif Intell Law

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The standard model of precedential constraint holds that a court is equally free to modify a precedent of its own and a precedent of a superior courtoverruling aside, it does not differentiate horizontal and vertical precedents. This paper shows that no model can capture the U.S. doctrine of precedent without making that distinction. A precise model is then developed that does just that. This requires situating precedent cases in a formal representation of a hierarchical legal structure, and adjusting the constraint that a precedent imposes based on the relationship of the precedent court and the instant court. The paper closes with suggestions for further improvements of the model. How do common law precedents constrain later courts?According to what Horty (2015) calls the standard model, a precedent court constrains later courts by announcing a rule, which later courts are then required to respect. 1 But respecting a rule, on this view, does not require applying the rule to every dispute that falls within its scope. Rather, in certain circumstances, a later court can avoid an applicable precedent rule by modifying it so that it no longer applies. The standard model holds that a court is equally free to modify a precedent of its own and a precedent of a superior court-like many formal models of common law reasoning, once the power to overrule is set aside, it does not differentiate

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Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent

Cited by 25 publications

References 34 publications

A formal analysis of some factor- and precedent-based accounts of precedential constraint

A formal analysis of some factor- and precedent-based accounts of precedential constraint

Before and after Dung: Argumentation in AI and Law

Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint

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