1996
DOI: 10.1177/016224399602100302
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Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority

Abstract: This article argues that, in public and policy contexts, the ways in which many scientists talk about uncertainty in simulations of future climate change not only facilitates communications and cooperation between scientific and policy communities but also affects the perceived authority of science. Uncertainty tends to challenge the authority of chmate science, especially if it is used for policy making, but the relationship between authority and uncertainty is not simply an inverse one. In policy contexts, m… Show more

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Cited by 376 publications
(316 citation statements)
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“…There are open questions about the best way to communicate information about strength of evidence (Shackley & Wynne, 1996) and whether experts are in fact capable of distinguishing between their estimates and their uncertainties (Bolger & Rowe, 2015).…”
Section: The Path To Improving Expert Judgement Validity Is Through Mmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are open questions about the best way to communicate information about strength of evidence (Shackley & Wynne, 1996) and whether experts are in fact capable of distinguishing between their estimates and their uncertainties (Bolger & Rowe, 2015).…”
Section: The Path To Improving Expert Judgement Validity Is Through Mmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this situation scientists must represent uncertainty in a way that assures their audience that the risks are tractable and manageable, and hence that their science is of practical value, while at the same time acknowledging the uncertainty enough to satisfy other scientists that the findings are still scientific (Shackley and Wynne 1996) [9]. This means constant engagement in the broader social arena to make sure that ones own scientific community, and its contributions, are recognized as inside the science boundary.…”
Section: The Factors That Produce Tunnel Visionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Nowotny 2003a(Nowotny , 2003b, but are also democratized in the sense that they must voice opinions on risks that are not necessarily areas of direct expertise (since risks, as described above, are interdisciplinary in nature). These experts must react to real-world and policy implications (Lynch 2004;Shackley and Wynne 1996;von Schomberg 1993a), as has clearly occurred in the case of the Council of Europe experts. As demonstrated below, the Council of Europe account heavily relied on this form of expertise in contesting the WHO's narrative of H1N1, and in constructing their own narrative of the events.…”
Section: Background To the Institutional Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%