Reputation, concessions, and territorial civil war

Abstract

Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.

Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

“…Similarly, Sambanis, Germann, and Schädel (2018) do not find that governments are more likely to accommodate or deny demands in cases with more potential challengers. Yet Bormann and Savun (2018) show that Walter's reputation argument does indeed hold up, despite the reservations noted in the prior research, when the precise scope conditions for the reputation for resolve theory are delineated, and point to the need to be clear on when and to who reputation is likely to be important.…”

“…In a seminal body of work, Walter (2006aWalter ( , 2006bWalter ( , 2009 shows that states' concerns for their reputation influence their propensity to grant concessions. Conversely, the decisions of ethnic groups to mobilize is shaped by their expectation that the government will concede, which is based largely on the governments reputation for conceding in the past (Walter 2006b; see also , Forsberg 2013;Cunningham 2014;Bormann and Savun 2018). Collectively this research suggests that reputation does indeed matter, but only insofar as it relates to the state's bargaining resolve (or lack thereof).…”

The Domestic Sources of International Reputation

“…The potential for leaders’ domestic choices while in office to influence their international reputations for resolve has received little attention. Some find that reputations for resolve in domestic conflict exist in interactions with domestic separatists (Bormann and Savun 2018; Walter 2006), but they do not consider whether these domestic reputations travel to the international level. Wu, Licht, and Wolford (2021) analyze how domestic politics influence leaders’ reputational incentives, but they do not consider how domestic choices influence international reputations.…”

Leader Tenure, Genocide, and Politicide During Civil War

“…Civil war does not occur unless a group believes it needs violence to force the leader to change policy. Leaders who are willing to make concessions to an opposition group tend to avoid war with that group (e.g., Bormann and Savun 2018; Lacina 2014). Groups who choose war against a longer-tenured leader are those that have come to distrust the regime to credibly change its policies.…”