Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

Abstract

How does the state’s behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state’s cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument.

Ceasefires in Civil Conflict: A Research Agenda

“…during mediation or religious holidays). Bara and Clayton (2022) in the aforementioned study in this issue, also speak to the timing of ceasefires, showing that a ceasefire in one dyad increases the likelihood of ceasefires in the following months in other dyads in the same country.…”

“…They demonstrate this through a novel analysis of geo-referenced data on 145 local ceasefires struck in Syria between 2011 and 2019. They also find that the shared history of interactions between the parties makes ceasefire more likely to de-escalate violence, pointing to the importance of parties developing a cooperative reputation that complements the findings of Bara and Clayton (2022). Importantly, this study represents the first systematic analysis of how these local ceasefires influence the dynamics of violence in civil war, which has clear policy relevance for the broad array of international actors currently promoting local arrangements as a favorable approach when elite-level processes are stalled.…”

“…One article in this special section develops existing knowledge on how ceasefires can shape a peace process. Bara and Clayton (2022), show that ceasefires can be used to generate a cooperative reputation that can strengthen efforts to find peace in other conflict dyads involving the same state. While prior studies have tended to focus only on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group, the authors focus on the broader conflict environment, arguing that non-state actors use the state’s actions toward other similar non-state actors to assess their credibility.…”

Local Ceasefires and De-escalation: Evidence From the Syrian Civil War

“…Parties in conflict learn, not only from previous interactions, but also from what is happening in nearby locations. Conciliatory interactions between different actors can diffuse to other contexts and create spatial dependencies (see Bara and Clayton 2022). For example, Axelrod (1984) analyzed measures of restraint during the First World War and identified how reciprocal conciliatory interactions could spread across locations of the battlefield: "the progress achieved in one small sector of the front could be imitated by the units in neighboring sectors" (79).…”

Introducing the ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset

“…Yet, as shown by Clayton et al (2022b) an increase in fatalities is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of a ceasefire, which should significantly lower the likelihood of short-term future violence. Moreover, Bara and Clayton (2022) show that ceasefires in one dyad can increase the government's reputation for cooperation, which can lead to violence also declining in other dyads within the same state. Until now the lack of appropriate data has prevented researchers from incorporating or controlling for such effects in their models.…”