Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups

Cuesta, José A.; Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos; Ferrer, Alfredo; Moreno, Yamir; Sánchez, Ángel

doi:10.1038/srep07843

Cited by 129 publications

(107 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In the Trust Problem condition greater degrees of information sharing produced higher levels of honored trust (Supplementary Table 2), confirming earlier studies that found that information sharing facilitates exchange91035. However, as a result of feedback in trustee selection enabled by information sharing, these gains in trust came with increased differentiation in exchange volume.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 85%

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

Frey

Rijt

2016

Sci Rep

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Trust is an essential condition for exchange. Large societies must substitute the trust traditionally provided through kinship and sanctions in small groups to make exchange possible. The rise of internet-supported reputation systems has been celebrated for providing trust at a global scale, enabling the massive volumes of transactions between distant strangers that are characteristic of modern human societies. Here we problematize an overlooked side-effect of reputation systems: Equally trustworthy individuals may realize highly unequal exchange volumes. We report the results of a laboratory experiment that shows emergent differentiation between ex ante equivalent individuals when information on performance in past exchanges is shared. This arbitrary inequality results from cumulative advantage in the reputation-building process: Random initial distinctions grow as parties of good repute are chosen over those lacking a reputation. We conjecture that reputation systems produce artificial concentration in a wide range of markets and leave superior but untried exchange alternatives unexploited.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 85%

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

Frey

Rijt

2016

Sci Rep

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“…In this two-person game, players must decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) and, similarly to several recent experimental settings (e.g 1718192123…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

Antonioni

Sánchez

Tomassini

2016

Sci Rep

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In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction. Cheaters end up being better off than honest individuals, who not only keep their true reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These findings point to the importance of ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.

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“…This is because participants tend to keep cooperative relationships while severing connections with defectors, and thus form cooperative and highly connected clusters in general (Rand et al, 2011). Recently, Cuesta et al (2015) showed the existence of reputation on neighbors (i.e., the history of their actions in the past a few rounds) can facilitate the emergence of cooperative clusters, and Antonioni et al (2016) further showed there existed two types of participants who are reliable subjects and cheaters when cheating her own reputation with a cost was allowed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

Suzuki

Ito

Kodera³

et al. 2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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This paper investigates interactions between game theoretical strategies and social relationships in real-time decision-making and rewarding environments. We propose an experimental framework based on techniques of web-based multiplayer online games for this purpose. In our framework, multiple human players, represented as particles in a two-dimensional space of social interactions, can modify their positions and game strategies for the prisoner's dilemma in real time, and receive benefit or cost emerging from both game theoretical and social relationships with neighboring players. We report on experiments with human participants in different conditions of the payoff matrix, which reflects game structures, and the speed of each player, which reflects the ability to change her social relationship. We show that cooperative relationships emerge in real human groups regardless of experimental settings, and show their basic behavioral patterns. We further discuss relationships between behavioral characters of participants in the experiments and their psychological characters to see how their personalities can be reflected in their behavior in such a game theoretical framework, and show that a few psychological characters of participants might reflect their behavioral characters at least in part, but there were variations in these relationships between experimental groups.

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Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups

Cited by 129 publications

References 27 publications

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment

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