Rescission and Repricing of Executive Stock Options

Yang, Jerry T.; Carleton, Willard T.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.303318

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Introduction1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2002

2008

Publication Types

Select...

Article2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Her predictions are borne out when confronted with the data following the 1987 stock market crash. Other relevant papers on the subject of option repricing include Carter and Lynch (2001), Grein, Hand and Klassen (2005), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003), Yang and Carleton (2002) and Jin and Meulbroek (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Option Compensation and Industry Competition

Stoughton

Wong

2008

Review of Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Compensation policy has become one of the most important ingredients of corporate governance. In this paper we take a new look at the issue, by contrasting the use of options with that of pure stock. We do this by integrating the repricing or resetting aspect of options with that of industrial structure. We show that industry competition may play an important role in dictating which form of compensation is optimal. When aggressive competition for key professional staff is an issue, the flexibility of options may actually become a disadvantage and therefore pure stock compensation may survive as an equilibrium. Thus compensation trends can be reconciled with trends in the nature of the competitive environment.

show abstract