Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Li, Tuochen; Zhou, Xinyu

doi:10.3390/ijerph19053046

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Such a high and appropriate government subsidy F = 0.1 is possible for institutions in real life and consistent with the real situation. Summing up, the government subsidy F can make the average in-probability and out-probability rise through the evolution of the game, while government subsidies F are unlikely to be large, an appropriate subsidy coefficient can strengthen the cooperative relationship in the innovation project [42]. The government can promote patent cooperation without providing very high subsidies, which also be found in section IV-A.…”

Section: Influence Of Wages and Government Subsidymentioning

confidence: 86%

Understanding the Cooperative Behavior Between Body of Production and Research Alliances Based on Games and Network

Liu

2023

IEEE Access

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In the process of creation, innovation subjects spontaneously form a technological innovation network by cooperation and sharing knowledge and resources. The data of patent joint applications can reflect the cooperation and interaction between innovation subjects, so the patent technological innovation network, patent cooperation network (PCN), can be constructed based on the data. The willingness of technological innovation subjects to continue cooperation directly affects the sustainable development of innovation networks. Considering the inequality of resources between enterprises and research institutions, a new game model is established, and the influence of various factors on the evolutionary game process is analyzed. And it is applied to the weighted directed patent technology innovation network. When the patent promoter has paid the project startup fund or salary to other patent institutions that accept the invitation and can obtain government subsidies, a higher proportion of patent excess income and government subsidies will be allocated to the outgoing nodes, which will enable them to have greater patent cooperation and R&D motivation; When the excess revenue of patents can be equally distributed, even if a small amount of salary or project startup fund is paid to the inbound nodes, the cooperation between them can be promoted. The government reduces the burden on R&D institutions by providing subsidies and incentive funds, but government subsidies can promote cooperation even if they are small.

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Section: Influence Of Wages and Government Subsidymentioning

confidence: 86%

Understanding the Cooperative Behavior Between Body of Production and Research Alliances Based on Games and Network

Liu

2023

IEEE Access

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“…With the increase in m, the enterprise can only obtain limited green credit support. Therefore, to reduce the costs and risks of innovation, the CDW recycling enterprise chooses collaborative innovation (Li & Zhou, 2022).…”

Section: Numerical Simulation and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…CDW recycling enterprises have two green technology innovation modes: independent innovation and collaborative innovation (Li & Zhou, 2022). Collaborative innovation is an innovation mode in which members of an organization respect and trust and share risks and resources to realize goals .…”

Section: Green Technology Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary mechanism of green technology innovation behavior in the operation period of construction and demolition waste recycling public–private partnership projects

Yin

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper aims to disclose the evolutionary mechanism of banks' green credit and construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling enterprises' green technology innovation behavior during the operation period of CDW recycling public–private partnership projects with absorptive capacity theory. The conclusions are as follows. First, the government subsidy coefficient has a positive effect on the evolution of banks to participate in green credit. Second, absorptive capacity and the level of collaboration have a positive effect on the evolution of CDW recycling enterprises to collaborative innovation. Third, CDW recycling enterprises' green technology innovation behavior interacts with banks' green credit participation strategy.

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“…Among them, Junmin Wu et al studied the new mechanism of collaborative innovation in the post-subsidy era, indicating that the status of the government should be transformed from a coordinator to a vital participant and its functions should be changed from guidance, coordination, and supervision to supervision and incentive [8]. Based on cellular automata theory, Tuochen Li and Xinyu Zhou concluded that increasing cooperative innovation income distribution fairness can consolidate industry-university collaborative innovation cooperation [9]. Karolin Sjoo and Tomas Hellstrom summarized seven factors that affected industry-academia collaborative innovation and discussed the degree of government policy intervention in aspects [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Government-Industry-University in Seasonal-Transportation of Freight Enterprises Under the Background of Carbon-Peaking and Carbon-Neutrality Goals

Jia,

2023

Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research

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China is now the world's highest carbon emission country. All circles focus is how to achieve carbon neutrality in just 40 years. China's carbon neutrality path will directly affect the future of the global industrial layout and investment direction. It is an important measure to promote the realization of carbon neutrality in the Chinese transportation industry through the collaborative innovation of seasonal transportation and government-industry-university. In this paper, under the dual-carbon background, the tripartite collective innovation game payment matrix of quarterly transportation of freight enterprises, universities, and governments is established. Using the triple evolutionary game method does not appear to modify the subject of the evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy selection. The influence of relevant parameters on the tripartite strategy selection is studied by Matlab numerical simulation. The results show government's incentive cost to enterprises and universities will affect the probability of the government's choice of incentive behavior. The amount of carbon tax paid by freight transportation enterprises can affect the probability of seasonal transportation and government incentive and supervision behavior of freight transportation enterprises. The research funds paid by freight transport enterprises to universities will affect the probability of strategic choice of both enterprises and universities.

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Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Cited by 12 publications

References 58 publications

Understanding the Cooperative Behavior Between Body of Production and Research Alliances Based on Games and Network

Understanding the Cooperative Behavior Between Body of Production and Research Alliances Based on Games and Network

Evolutionary mechanism of green technology innovation behavior in the operation period of construction and demolition waste recycling public–private partnership projects

Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Government-Industry-University in Seasonal-Transportation of Freight Enterprises Under the Background of Carbon-Peaking and Carbon-Neutrality Goals

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