Resistance to Implementing IMF Stabilization Plans: Evidence from a Cross-Country Study

Abstract

Resumo o paper discutc tres aspectos da resistencia dos paises em cumprirem as mctas dos pIanos de cstabiliza<;oes formuladas pelo FMI. Primeiro, uma definic;ao para urn indicador dcste tipo e aprcscntada. A releva-ncia do fenomeno da re sistencia coloea em duvida supostos impactos que os programas do FM! trazem conformc sugerido em Pastor (1987).Segundo, urn modele logit e ajustado a uma amostra de 43 paises para identifi ear os fatores que explicam a resistencia. Os resultados mostram que a magnitude dos choques externos bern como a distribuic;ao de renda sao fatores relevantes. as resultados cncontrados para esta ultima variavel estao parcial mente em linha com a cvidencia emplrica de Berg e Sachs (1988) e as motiva<;5es teoricas em Alesina e Drazen (1989). Terceiro, algumas imp1ic�Oes de politica sao derivadas a rcspeito das difi culdadcs que autoridades brasileiras e de orga nismos intcrnacionais provavelmentc cncontradi.o ao tentarem implemcntar uma politica de estabiliza<;ao do tipo do FMI. AbstractThe paper addresses three aspects of the country's resistance to meet the targets of IMF stabilization plans. First, a definition and an indicator of such phenomenon is provided. The fact that resistance is found to be important poses doubts about presumed impacts of IMF programs such as in Pastor (1987).Second, a logit model is fi tted to a data set of 43 countries to search for the resistance factors. The magnitude of the external shocks as well as income concentration were found to be relevant. The results obtained for this last variable are partially in line with the empirical evidence of Berg and Sachs (1988) and the theoretical motivation of Alesina and Drazen (1989). Third, a few policy implications are derived regarding the difficulties national and supra-national authorities are likely to face in attempting to enforce IMF stabilization measures.

Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments

“…The 16. Among capitalist developing countries, stabilization programs were more likely to be abandoned where distribution of income was more unequal (Oliveira 1991).…”