Resisting anchoring effects: The roles of metric and mapping knowledge

Abstract

The biasing influence of anchors on numerical estimates is well established, but the relationship between knowledge level and the susceptibility to anchoring effects is less clear. In two studies, we addressed the potential mitigating effects of having knowledge in a domain on vulnerability to anchoring effects in that domain. Of critical interest was a distinction between two forms of knowledge-metric and mapping knowledge. In Study 1, participants who had studied question-relevant information-that is, high-knowledge participants-were less influenced by anchors than were participants who had studied irrelevant information. The results from knowledge measures suggested that the reduction in anchoring was tied to increases in metric rather than mapping knowledge. In Study 2, participants studied information specifically designed to influence different types of knowledge. As we predicted, increases in metric knowledge-and not mapping knowledge-led to reduced anchoring effects. Implications for debiasing anchoring effects are discussed.

Knowledge and Anchoring: Verification of Three Circumstances in Which Knowledge Does Not Interfere with Anchoring

“…Past researches on anchoring conducted by researchers in the past focused on verifying the existence of the anchoring effect [5] [6], whereas recently, researchers have begun to consider knowledge as a very important variable in the research regarding the anchoring effect [16] [17]. However, there has yet been any conclusion as to whether knowledge has any influence on anchoring.…”

“…Numeric and magnitude priming posits that anchors prime numbers or magnitudes similar to the anchor value [16]. When participants generated their estimates, these primed numbers were more likely to come to mind, thereby influencing their estimates [4] [21], in their experiments on the price of residential real estate, asked participants to estimate the price of a local house based on listing prices the authors gave them that varied from low to high.…”

“…According to this heuristic, people start with an implicitly suggested reference point (the "anchor") and make adjustments to it to reach their estimate. Owing to a large range of plausible estimates, adjustments that start from a low anchor stop at the lower end of this range, whereas adjustments from a high anchor terminate at the upper end of the range [16]. The study by [19] also found that, when participants were unable to fully compute a long sequence of calculations within a short span of time, the median in the estimate they made regarding the ascending sequence (1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8) was higher (2250 versus 512) than that regarding the descending sequence (8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1).…”

“…For example, [11] demonstrated that knowledge can, and likely often does, moderate anchoring effects, though they do not assume that this will always be the case. Furthermore, [16] revealed that the particular type of knowledge that people possess is an important determinant of their susceptibility to the anchoring effect. Further, [17] concluded that people's judgments of their own recent behaviors are susceptible to numeric anchors and that self-knowledge does not necessarily reduce the influence of anchors.…”

Confidently Biased: Comparisons with Anchors Bias Estimates and Increase Confidence

“…For example, experts and novices both tend to exhibit anchoring effects (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, ; Northcraft & Neale, ). However, it does appear to be the case that more knowledgeable people are less influenced by anchors (Smith & Windschitl, ; Smith, Windschitl, & Bruchmann, ) and that people exhibit smaller anchoring effects when they gain more experience (Mussweiler & Englich, ).…”