Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Fleisher, Will; Šešelja, Dunja

doi:10.1017/psa.2022.9

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…A number of authors have recently argued that there is an important role for shared epistemic responsibility in our epistemic communities (cf. De Haan 2021; Fleisher and Šešelja 2023). For instance, Boyd Millar (2021) argues that individuals can be responsible not only for their own individual epistemic conduct, but can also be jointly responsible for the joint epistemic conduct of the collective of which they are a part.…”

Section: Shared Vs Vicarious Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic Complicity

Boult

2023

Episteme

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There is a widely accepted distinction between being directly responsible for a wrongdoing versus being somehow indirectly or vicariously responsible for the wrongdoing of another person or collective. Often this is couched in analyses of complicity, and complicity's role in the relationship between individual and collective wrongdoing. Complicity is important because, inter alia, it allows us to make sense of individuals who may be blameless or blameworthy to a relatively low degree for their immediate conduct, but are nevertheless blameworthy to a higher degree for their implication in some larger (or another person's) wrongdoing. In this paper, I argue that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of complicity. First, I motivate the distinction between direct and vicarious responsibility with three interlocking arguments, respectively appealing to: (i) the structure of rational agency; (ii) linguistic considerations; (iii) the role of ‘principal' vs. ‘accomplice’ in legal doctrine. I show how these arguments naturally extend to the epistemic domain, motivating an epistemic form of vicarious responsibility. I then examine complicity as a mechanism of vicarious epistemic responsibility. To fill this out, I engage with an epistemic analogue of the debate about the role of intention versus causal contribution in complicity. I propose a Casual Account of Epistemic Complicity, arguing that it accommodates a wide range of cases, and enables fine-grained explanations of degrees of culpability for epistemic complicity. With an adequate account of epistemic complicity on hand, we can explain what is objectionable about an important class of epistemic agent who, on an individual level, may be epistemically blameless or blameworthy to a relatively low degree, but whose relation to other individuals or collectives nevertheless makes them epistemically blameworthy to a higher degree. I explore some broader implications of this result.

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Section: Shared Vs Vicarious Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Schwenkenbecher 2022;Fleisher and Šešelja 2023;De Haan 2021;Mitova 2022; Palermos 2022. 7 Two notable recent exceptions of authors engaging with vicarious epistemic responsibilitythough not in this terminology, and in more specific ways than I do so hereare Mitova (2022) andPalermos (2022).…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemic Complicity

Boult

2023

Episteme

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“…Others, however, aware of the importance of collaborations in science, the relational nature of scientific practice, as well as of the complexity of factors in science that might properly be a target of epistemic and ethical obligations have focused on teams, scientific communities, or institutions as those with particular responsibilities to ensure that science is socially responsible (Kitcher 2001;Miller 2011;Rolin 2015;Dang 2019;Fleisher & Šešelja 2022). On these accounts, conducting science involves both social and epistemic collective ends, e.g., generating knowledge or predictions that can avert future large-scale harms or delivering safe and effective treatments against diseases, that require collective action and call for collective responsibilities.…”

Section: Who Is Responsible?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Socially responsible science: Exploring the complexities

Melo‐Martín

Intemann

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation.

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On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication

Intemann,

de Melo-Martín

2023

Synthese

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Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Cited by 7 publications

References 58 publications

Epistemic Complicity

Epistemic Complicity

Socially responsible science: Exploring the complexities

On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication

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