Agri-en vi ron ment-cli mate schemes (AES) form the most im por tant pol icy in stru ment for con ser va tion of bio di ver sity in the Eu ro pean Union, in clud ing Fin land (European Environment Agency, 2004). The AES bud gets reg u larly equal or ex ceed the amount of money spent on wildlife and na ture con ser va tion ef forts through other routes (Batáry et al., 2015). De spite this large ex pen di ture, farm land bio di ver sity con tinues to de cline in all EU mem ber states, and AES are too lim ited in extent to re verse the larger-scale im pacts of other CAP in stru ments (Pe'er et al., 2017). Other short com ings of the cur rent sys tem range from insuf ciently clear pol icy aims and as so ci ated prob lems with mon i tor ing to lack of ex i bil ity of im ple men ta tion un der var ied site con di tions to poor cul tural sus tain abil ity (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; European Court of Auditors, 2011; Poláková et al., 2011). The cur rent sys tem is based on pre scribed ac tions to be car ried out and is heav ily top down. Farm ers are mainly ob lig ated to carry out actions, some times ac cord ing to spe ci c dates, for pay ment. Pre scribed man age ment ac tions may not favour, or even iden tify, op ti mal manage ment for meet ing con ser va tion tar gets on a par tic u lar site or empower man agers to ad dress is sues or con di tions for op ti mal man agement (Pullin and Knight, 2003). Ad di tion ally, the ac tions-based approach is crit i cized as lack ing cul tural sus tain abil ity: it has failed to instil long-term at ti tu di nal change amongst farm ers (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011) and is claimed to ' dis in cen tivise' farm ers by intro duc ing a highly reg u la tory en vi ron ment that dis cour ages in no v a tive and site-spe ci c ap proaches and in stead links farmer be hav iour more to mon e tary stim uli than ap pre ci a tion of re sults of their work (