Retail Market Equilibrium in Multicarrier Energy Systems: A Game Theoretical Approach

Khazeni, Sepideh; Sheikhi, Aras; Rayati, Mohammad; Soleymani, Soudabeh; Ranjbar, Ali Mohammad

doi:10.1109/jsyst.2018.2812807

Cited by 41 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Studies also consider the case of two non-cooperative games with different market conditions: one is competition without any conditions, and the other is a Stackelberg game limited by transaction price and size. In [68], a two-layer game model between the energy retailer and the consumer is established for the transaction between the focal energy retailer and the consumer. The first layer first provides the retail price for the energy, and the consumer responds to the price provided and minimizes energy expenditure in the second layer.…”

Section: ) Demand Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Game Theory in Integrated Energy System Systems: A Review

Li³

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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With the rapid development of society, global energy is in short supply. China has put forward an integrated energy system focusing on interconnecting energy resources and harnessing their complementary advantages to address the energy crisis, thus no longer pursuing the production, transportation and supply of a single source of energy. In the continuous development of integrated energy systems, the elements of participation and interaction are becoming more complex. Game theory, which can effectively solve the problems arising from multi-agent trading, is naturally introduced to the integrated energy system. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the introduction of game theory into the integrated energy system. First, the development of integrated energy is briefly introduced, game scenarios in integrated energy systems is proposed, and game scenarios considering the energy supply side, distribution network, demand side and common planning and dispatching problems in integrated energy systems are summarized. Secondly, main game theory models in the integrated energy system are summarized, such as cooperative game theory model, the non-cooperative game theory model and the Stackelberg game theory model. Finally, the future prospect and challenge for the application of game theory in integrated energy systems is proposed. The new game models are introduced to the integrated energy system, and a mixed game is considered to solve related problems. It is hoped that this work can serve as a reference for the researchers in this field. INDEX TERMS Integrated energy system, game theory, energy management, demand response.

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Section: ) Demand Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Game Theory in Integrated Energy System Systems: A Review

Li³

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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“…Inequalities (24) and (25) denote that upper-level bound for shiftable load is a factor of the scheduled load (τ up t , τ dn t ), which varies for different time slots…”

Section: Aggregator Competition: Higher-level Optimisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Liu et al [23] have utilised a bilevel optimisation to model an effective energy sharing management for microgrids with PV generation. In [24], a bilevel game between energy retailers and consumers with firm loads is modelled and a discretisation technique is proposed to simplify the problem. A modified auction-based Stackelberg game is proposed in [25], which models the interaction among the shared facility controllers and residential units to determine the auction price and the allocation of energy storage shared.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy pricing and demand scheduling in retail market: how microgrids’ integration affects the market

Ahmadi¹,

Akrami²,

Doostizadeh

et al. 2020

IET Smart Grid

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This study proposes a single-leader-multi follower game to model a bilevel retail market among an aggregator and multiple microgrids to determine the optimal demand scheduling of the consumer, as well as price-power bidding strategies of microgrids in an interactive scheme. In the lower level, microgrids which include several distributed energy resources and energy storage units, compete with each other and offer the optimal energy-price bids such that their individual profit is maximised, while energy dispatch among their energy resources is also determined. Then, in the upper-level problem, the aggregator leads the competition taking advantages of demand-side management including interruptible and shiftable loads to minimise its energy payment for real-time pricing of generation units. By means of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition, the bilevel optimisation of Stackelberg game is reduced to a single-level mixed-integer linear programming problem. Moreover, impact of microgrids' integration on the retail market clearance mechanism, as well as required incentives for such integration has been discussed in a separate scenario.

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“…Reference [10] improved the optimal heat flow model and optimal power flow model for market clearing. Reference [11] proposed a two-stage hybrid random information gap decision theory model for the market clearing. Reference [12] established a bi-level Stackelberg game model between energy retailers and consumers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transactive Energy-Based Joint Optimization of Energy and Flexible Reserve for Integrated Electric-Heat Systems

Zhao

Diao

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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Implementing integrated electric-heat systems (IEHSs) with coupled power distribution networks and district heating networks is an essential means to solve current energy problems. However, prosumers with multiple energy forms coupled and renewable energy sources with natural uncertainties pose challenges to the operation of IEHSs. This paper proposes a joint energy and reserve dispatch model for IEHSs based on transactive energy, which is a coordinated combination of a bi-level Stackelberg game and two-stage robust optimization. The bi-level Stackelberg game is used to realize the equilibrium of interests among three transacting parties, namely, integrated energy service provider (IESP), multi-carrier prosumer (MCP), and load aggregator (LA). The two-stage robust optimization is employed to ensure the reliability of the system operation under renewable energy uncertainty. In the upper level of the Stackelberg game, the IESP perform pricing and reserve dispatch, while the MCP and LA maximize their benefits via energy management in the lower level. Linearization techniques are utilized to approximate the bi-level Stackelberg game model into a single-level mixed-integer linear programming problem. The converted single-level game model is subsequently regarded as the first stage, while the real-time feasibility check is regarded as the second stage to form a two-stage robust optimization model, which is solved by a modified C&CG algorithm. Case studies demonstrate that the proposed joint energy and reserve dispatch method effectively achieves economic and reliable operation. INDEX TERMS Integrated electric-heat system, transactive energy, joint energy and reserve dispatch, Stackelberg game, two-stage robust optimization.

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Retail Market Equilibrium in Multicarrier Energy Systems: A Game Theoretical Approach

Cited by 41 publications

References 40 publications

Application of Game Theory in Integrated Energy System Systems: A Review

Application of Game Theory in Integrated Energy System Systems: A Review

Energy pricing and demand scheduling in retail market: how microgrids’ integration affects the market

Transactive Energy-Based Joint Optimization of Energy and Flexible Reserve for Integrated Electric-Heat Systems

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