Retention of frequency information with observations on recognition and recall.

Underwood, Benton J.; Zimmerman, Joel; Freund, Joel S.

doi:10.1037/h0030544

Cited by 82 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…This is not problematic here, however, becauseas in other applications of cumulative prospect theory to decisions from experience (e.g., Abdellaoui, L'Haridon, & Paraschiv, 2011;Jarvstad, Hahn, Rushton, & Warren, 2013;Kellen, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2016;Lejarraga, Pachur, Frey, & Hertwig, 2016;Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009)-we only model the valuation at the end of the sampling process. Nevertheless, it should be noted that when applying cumulative prospect theory to decisions from experience, we assume that people have an accurate sense of the relative frequencies of the outcomes they experience (which are then used as probabilities in the modeling); this seems a plausible assumption (e.g., Hasher & Chromiak, 1977;Underwood, Zimmerman, & Freund, 1971;Ungemach et al, 2009). The comparison of reinforcement learning and instance-based learning theory with cumulative prospect theory allows us to test whether processes specific to experiential learning (e.g., recency, memory decay) are necessary to capture buyer-seller discrepancies in pricing decisions from experience.…”

Section: Abstract Computational Modeling Endowment Effect Risky Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unpacking buyer-seller differences in valuation from experience: A cognitive modeling approach

Pachur

Scheibehenne

2017

Psychon Bull Rev

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People often indicate a higher price for an object when they own it (i.e., as sellers) than when they do not (i.e., as buyers)-a phenomenon known as the endowment effect. We develop a cognitive modeling approach to formalize, disentangle, and compare alternative psychological accounts (e.g., loss aversion, loss attention, strategic misrepresentation) of such buyer-seller differences in pricing decisions of monetary lotteries. To also be able to test possible buyer-seller differences in memory and learning, we study pricing decisions from experience, obtained with the sampling paradigm, where people learn about a lottery's payoff distribution from sequential sampling. We first formalize different accounts as models within three computational frameworks (reinforcement learning, instance-based learning theory, and cumulative prospect theory), and then fit the models to empirical selling and buying prices. In Study 1 (a reanalysis of published data with hypothetical decisions), models assuming buyer-seller differences in response bias (implementing a strategicmisrepresentation account) performed best; models assuming buyer-seller differences in choice sensitivity or memory (implementing a loss-attention account) generally fared worst. In a new experiment involving incentivized decisions (Study 2), models assuming buyer-seller differences in both outcome sensitivity (as proposed by a loss-aversion account) and response bias performed best. In both Study 1 and 2, the models implemented in cumulative prospect theory performed best. Model recovery studies validated our cognitive modeling approach, showing that the models can be distinguished rather well. In summary, our analysis supports a loss-aversion account of the endowment effect, but also reveals a substantial contribution of simple response bias. Keywords Computational modeling . Endowment effect . Risky decision making . Decision from experience . Loss aversionThe minimum price at which people are willing to accept to sell an object they own is often higher than the maximum price they are willing to pay for the same object when they do not own it. This systematic difference between buying and selling prices-which can also occur within the same person when taking different perspectives-is known as the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990, 1991Thaler, 1980; see also Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979). The endowment effect has attracted considerable attention because it contradicts a central tenet of economic theory: According to the Coase theorem, the value of an object should be independent of its initial ownership (Kahneman et al., 1990).There have been several proposals as to which cognitive mechanisms give rise to the endowment effect, or how buyers' and sellers' cognitive mechanisms might differ generally.1 For instance, there may be asymmetries between buyers and sellers in terms of the order in which they search for positive 1 Note that this issue is orthogonal to the question of which aspects of being endowed-such as ownership, expectations...

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Section: Abstract Computational Modeling Endowment Effect Risky Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unpacking buyer-seller differences in valuation from experience: A cognitive modeling approach

Pachur

Scheibehenne

2017

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…The use of discrimination coefficients is appropriate for frequency judgments due to the fact that the relationship between true and judged frequency approximates a linear function, even after delay (Underwood, Zimmerman, & Freund, 1971). The slight negative acceleration which is typically found in frequency curves (e.g., Hintzman, 1969) does not seem serious enough to invalidate a measure of accuracy based on correlation coefficients.…”

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confidence: 99%

Further evidence regarding instructional effects on frequency judgments

Flexser

Bower

1975

Bull. Psychon. Soc.

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Previous experimental reports have provided contradictory evidence regarding instructional effects on frequency judgments. An experiment was performed to clarify these findings, in which frequency discrimination was compared for two groups of sUbjects. One group was instructed as to the nature of the forthcoming frequency judgment task, while the other was told to prepare for an unspecified memory task. To avoid the possibility of response bias effects, the frequency discrimination coefficient, a correlational measure, was used to assess performance. Howell's 1973 finding of no instructional effects on frequency judgments was replicated. An attempt is made to reconcile this result with the finding by Begg and Rowe that subjects in a continuous frequency judgment task gave unusually accurate mean frequency judgments compared to subjects who were tested following study of all items. Interest in how infonnation is structured in (1969a). Underwood proposes that frequency is memory, and in the nature of the memory trace, has represented as just one of a set of attributes led in recent years to investigations of how humans are comprising the generic memory trace of a repeated able to discriminate in memory between the event. This hypothesis differs from the simple frequencies of different events. A review by strength hypothesis described above in that Howell (1973a) distinguishes four hypotheses repetitions are assumed to boost the "strength" ofthe regarding the mechanism underlying this ability: frequency attribute, rather than the strength of the trace strength, multiple trace, multiple process, memory trace as a whole. 1 and numerical inference.Opposed to these trace-strength views is the The trace-strength hypothesis holds that each multiple-trace hypothesis, which holds that repetirepetition of an event strengthens a generic tions of an event result in separate memory traces representation of that event in memory, and that a rather than in the strengthening of a single trace. frequency judgment is derived from the current Within this framework, frequency estimates are seen strength. The simplest version of this hypothesis as being derived from a count of the number of maintains that this same trace strength also relevant memory traces accessed by a given probe. determines the level of performance in other tasks The result of such a count need not coincide exactly which rely upon the same memory trace, such as recall with the subject's frequency estimate; he may also use or recognition. However, experimental evidence has availability heuristics similar to those described by failed to show the expected strict correspondence Tversky and Kahneman (1973) to mediate between between mean frequency judgments and probability the retrieval stage and the response stage of the of recall or recognition. For example, frequency frequency estimation process. Thus, the subject may judgments and recall are affected differently by sample only a fraction of the total number of memory instructions (Howell, 1973b) and primacy in seri...

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“…Studies of frequency judgments have shown that people are highly sensitive to variations among events in their frequencies of occurrence (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984;Hintzman, 1988;Jonides & Naveh-Benjamin, 1987;Underwood, Zimmerman, & Freund, 1971). Such studies usually involve the presentationof a relatively small number of unique events over a short time span, relatively little variation over items in frequency of occurrence, and the administration of a memory test shortly after the set of target events has been presented (but see Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978;Underwood et al, 1971).…”

Section: Reports Of Frequency Of Dietary Intakementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such studies usually involve the presentationof a relatively small number of unique events over a short time span, relatively little variation over items in frequency of occurrence, and the administration of a memory test shortly after the set of target events has been presented (but see Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978;Underwood et al, 1971). In contrast, the reference events of a food-frequency questionnaire are many in number, have occurred with a wide range of frequencies over an extended time period, and constitute but a small fraction of the entire set of events experienced by the respondent during the reference period.…”

Section: Reports Of Frequency Of Dietary Intakementioning

confidence: 99%

Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports

Schwarz¹,

Sudman²

1994

231

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), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use of general descriptive names, trade names, trademarks, etc., in this publication, even if the former are not especially identified, is not to be taken as a sign that such names, as understood by the Trade Marks and Merchandise Marks Act, may accordingly be used freely by anyone.Production managed by Hal Henglein; manufacturing supervised by Jacqui Ashri. Camera-ready copy prepared by the editors. Printed and bound by Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI. Printed in the United States of America. 987654321ISBN 0-387-94167-3 Springer-Verlag New York Berlin Heidelberg ISBN 3-540-94167-3 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York AcknowledgmentsThe conference on which the present volume is based was supported by the Walter Stellner Endowment in the Departmentof Business Administration of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, by the Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim, Germany, and by grant SWF 0044-6 from the Bundesminister fur Forschung und Technologie to Norbert Schwarz. In addition, preparation of the present volume was supported by a transatlantic cooperation grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung to Norbert Schwarz, Norman M. Bradburn, Hans-J, Hippler, and Seymour Sudman.We also wish to thank the staff of the Robert Allerton Park and Conference Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for facilitating the interaction of the participants with their delightful midwestern cooking, and at the social hours and coffee breaks. We wish to thank Mary A. Spaeth for her careful editing and for formatting the material into camera-ready copy. Finally, we thank all of the conference participants for the fine chapters that they submitted and for their useful comments on each other's initial drafts that helped improve the final versions.Ann Arbor Chapter 5Mahzarin R. Banaji is Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Yale University. Her research examines systems of affect, self, stereotyping and prejudice. She is also interested in the theoretical analysis of method.Curtis Hardin is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at Yale University. His research interests include the role of social identity processes in affect, memory, social judgments, and sense of self. Chapter 6Peter Salovey received his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from Yale University, where he is Associate Professor and contributing to both the social/ personality and clinical psychology programs. His major research interest is the function of human emotion, especially how emotions direct cognition, motivate social behavior, and color close relationships. He has recently been concerned with the influence of emotion on perceptions of Introduction and Overview Norbert Schwarz and Seymour SudmanMuch of our ...

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Retention of frequency information with observations on recognition and recall.

Cited by 82 publications

References 6 publications

Unpacking buyer-seller differences in valuation from experience: A cognitive modeling approach

Unpacking buyer-seller differences in valuation from experience: A cognitive modeling approach

Further evidence regarding instructional effects on frequency judgments

Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports

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