Retention, Truth-Content and Selective Realism

Cordero, Alberto

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_13

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In a weaker sense, however, the success of T can be explained simply by assuming that it has some true components (even if we cannot identify them) from which its novel predictions were derived; in fact, it would be a miracle if novel predictions (especially if highly precise and unexpected) were derived from false assumptions. Psillos (1999), Votsis (2011), Peters (2014) and Cordero (2015) argue that strong prospective explanation is possible, since there are criteria for identifying the probably true components of past theories independently of their preservation today. For instance, for Votsis those components are the "minimally interpreted mathematical parts"; for Peters they are the minimal sub-theories which are presupposed by the successful predictions and not empirically refuted; for Cordero they are those involved in predictive success, resistant to hostile probing and with outside support.…”

Section: Explaining the Success Of Discarded Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

Alai

2016

Synthese

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There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic\ud meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming\ud that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that\ud pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones.Aradical version of discontinuity\ud realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between\ud true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot\ud be shown to be even partially true (except insofar they agree with current ones), while\ud present best theories are demonstrably completely true. I argue that this position, running\ud counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot\ud account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and\ud rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide.\ud The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some\ud falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea\ud that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones.\ud Keywords Gerald Doppelt · Best theory realism · Selective realisms · Pessimisti

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Section: Explaining the Success Of Discarded Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

Alai

2016

Synthese

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“…Thus the realist's defense against both the PM-I and the M-MT would be circular. This is why it would seem desirable that the components of past theories which are essential for their novel predictions are identified prospectively; moreover, Votsis (2011), Peters (2014), Cordero (2017aCordero ( , 2017b and others claim that such prospective identification is possible. On the opposite side, Stanford (2006, 167-180;2009, 385-387) claims this is impossible, therefore the arguments for DR are circular.…”

Section: Essentiality Cannot Be Detected Prospectivelymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Historical Challenge to Realism and Essential Deployment

Alai¹

2021

Contemporary Scientific Realism

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This chapter outlines how Deployment Realism resists Laudan and Lyons’s objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. Criticizing Psillos’s criterion of essentiality, Lyons argued that Deployment Realism must committed itself to all the actually deployed assumptions and concluded that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail, since many actually deployed assumptions proved false. The chapter replies that an essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor and that there is, in fact, a simpler formulation of essentiality that escapes Lyons’s criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. The chapter concludes that, although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism.

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“…(1) noticing that science progresses in a number of very concrete and measurable ways: available data increase, instruments and methodologies are improved, the quantity of researchers, publications and resources grows all the time. Moreover, this progress has become faster and faster in the last decades (Fahrbach 2011, Cordero, 2017a. It can hardly be disputed that all this allows us to conceive better and better theories and to rule out more and more theories which do not satisfy either some empirical or theoretical constraints.…”

Section: Transient But Recurrent Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, Cordero (2017aCordero ( , 2017b, Peters (2014), Votsis (2011) and others have discussed criteria by which we can identify some true components of false theories. To be precise, I argued (Alai 2017b) that we can identify claims that are at least partially true, and this of course is compatible with subsequently discovering that such claims also include some false content, so they are false tout court and call for replacement by more completely true claims.…”

Section: Transient But Recurrent Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

Alai

2018

Axiomathes

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The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and we can choose among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of theoretical virtues. True, in current quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some advancement in the state of the art: in past history we never witnessed unsolvable scientific problems. Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits. Realism is not a claim of omniscience: since the reality we know is subjectindependent, gaps or mistakes are always possible in principle.

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Retention, Truth-Content and Selective Realism

Cited by 9 publications

References 15 publications

Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

The Historical Challenge to Realism and Essential Deployment

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

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