Rethinking Care Ethics: On the Promise and Potential of an Intersectional Analysis

Abstract

This article contributes to current debates and discussions in critical social theory about diversity, inclusion/exclusion, power, and social justice by exploring intersectionality as an important theoretical resource to further develop and advance care ethics. Using intersectionality as a critical reference point, the investigation highlights two key shortcomings of care ethics which stem from this ethics’ prioritization of gender and gendered power relations: inadequate conceptualizations of diversity and power. The article draws on concrete examples related to migrant domestic work to illustrate how an intersectionality lens can advance new theoretical insights for understanding caring practices (or lack of them), and generate new methodological and practical strategies for confronting and transforming the deeply entrenched interlocking power inequities that undermine the realization of care in an increasingly complex context of national and international policy and politics.

Men do care! : A gender-aware and masculinity-informed contribution to caregiving scholarship

“…In this section, I will discuss these concepts in an attempt both to provide insight into some of the key issues brought to the fore by the second generation of care researchers and to show that some of these approaches still neglect the fact that men care. I will end this section by returning to Tronto's (1993Tronto's ( , 1995Tronto's ( , 2001) continued development of Gilligan's ethics of care and Hankivsky's (2014) criticism directed towards the ethics of care as a political judgment. I will do this because I believe in Hankivsky's (2014) argument that even though the second generation of researchers claim to have an intersectionality perspective on care they still center their arguments around gender and gender manifestations of power instead of seeking understanding for what is created and experienced at the intersection of different axes of oppression.…”

“…I will end this section by returning to Tronto's (1993Tronto's ( , 1995Tronto's ( , 2001) continued development of Gilligan's ethics of care and Hankivsky's (2014) criticism directed towards the ethics of care as a political judgment. I will do this because I believe in Hankivsky's (2014) argument that even though the second generation of researchers claim to have an intersectionality perspective on care they still center their arguments around gender and gender manifestations of power instead of seeking understanding for what is created and experienced at the intersection of different axes of oppression. Knijn and Kremer (1997) define care as work that may be either paid or unpaid and which involves the physiological, emotional and physical strains that taking care of dependent people can entail.…”

“…Their ethics of care also offers a conceptualization of care as a social good, acknowledging that care is an activity that can be both private and parochial as well as something that concerns institutions, societies and even levels of global thinking. Nevertheless, Hankivsky (2014) argues that theorists that have launched the concept of the ethics of care, along with other care theorists (cf. Sevenhuijsen 1998 andScuzzarello 2010) cannot account for the intersectional perspective even if they are claiming to do so.…”

“…Sevenhuijsen 1998 andScuzzarello 2010) cannot account for the intersectional perspective even if they are claiming to do so. Hankivsky (2014) writes that:…”

Discapacidad: una heurística para la condición humana

“…Deepening this self-representation is relevant since it affects the ethical theories that justify relationships care 11,12 , as well as the foundation of the rights of persons with disabilities 13,14 . However, our self-representation must be confronted with the concrete human being considering the peculiar way in which we possess our qualities 15 and not with an abstract model.…”