Rethinking ostensive communication in an evolutionary, comparative, and developmental perspective

Abstract

Ostensive communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) involves both an informative and a communicative intention: The communicator draws attention not only to the information she intends to convey but also to her intention to convey it. This elicits an expectation of relevance in addressees that guides them in interpreting the information communicated. This notion of ostensive communication has been influential in pragmatics, developmental psychology, and comparative psychology but also raises many questions. In the light of much relevant research, elaborations, and criticisms over the years, we put forward a revised, broadened, more explicit, and more explanatory account of ostensive communication and of the role played in it by cognitive expectations of relevance and social expectations of cooperativeness. We distinguish two forms of ostension: in basic ostension communicators give direct evidence of the information communicated; in mentalistic communication, they give indirect evidence of this information by giving direct evidence of their intention to convey it. We interpret relevant comparative psychology findings (such as Gómez 1986) as suggesting that a basic, non-mentalistic form of ostension evolved in great apes as a solution to the problems and opportunities presented by intentional communication. We discuss Csibra and Gergely’s (2009) “natural pedagogy theory” claim that ostension is specifically adapted for the transmission of general knowledge to children. Correcting earlier pragmatic theories inspired by Grice (1989) (including our own), we argue that typical verbal communication makes use of both basic and mentalistic ostension.