2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01290.x
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Rethinking Regime Politics

Abstract: Many recent studies of "regime politics" argue that judicial review is ultimately used to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime. I explore this claim by evaluating whether the invalidation of federal laws by the US Supreme Court fits the empirical expectations of the regime politics approach. I find that the Court frequently invalidates statutes when (1) the ideology of the Court diverges from that of the sitting elected branches (suggesting that the Court does not fear sanctions or nonimpleme… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Second, we refine Carson and Crespin's approach to electoral competition, re-conceiving it more broadly as a meaningful democratic choice between an incumbent and a well-qualified challenger, rather than as just an arbitrary vote percentage or margin. Finally, we provide a more rigorous test of a theory-regime politics-that has too often relied on anecdotal, rather than empirical, evidence (Hall 2012).…”
Section: Previous Research: the Impact Of ''Judicial Redistricting''mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, we refine Carson and Crespin's approach to electoral competition, re-conceiving it more broadly as a meaningful democratic choice between an incumbent and a well-qualified challenger, rather than as just an arbitrary vote percentage or margin. Finally, we provide a more rigorous test of a theory-regime politics-that has too often relied on anecdotal, rather than empirical, evidence (Hall 2012).…”
Section: Previous Research: the Impact Of ''Judicial Redistricting''mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The close association between judges and their ideological or partisan counterparts in the elected branches, including the judiciary's reliance on support from partisan officials to gain access to and remain on the bench, suggests that judges are part of a political coalition or regime whose interests they are expected to protect or advance in their judicial decision making. Although the regime politics hypothesis has come under scrutiny for its alleged lack of conceptual specificity and non‐falsifiability (Hall ), redistricting litigation is an especially relevant policy area for examining regime politics due to the direct political consequences involved in districting decisions. Rarely, if ever, do judges encounter another opportunity to hand down a decision whose ramifications shape the contours of electoral and partisan competition so thoroughly.…”
Section: A Theory Of Partisan Calculation In Judicial Redistrictingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Critics of the regime politics approach argue that there is a tendency to overstate the impact of the political regime (Keck, 2007: 511). Hall (2012) finds that the Court frequently invalidates statutes when the ideology of the sitting regime and that of the Court diverges or when the ideology of the regime that enacted the law and the sitting regime converges. Graber writes that no one elaborating regime politics theory claims that the Supreme Court simply mirrors party platforms or consistently selects policies favoured by most political elites, rather, “at least some, often shifting, subset of the lawmaking elite supports particular judicial decisions or the trend of judicial decision making.…”
Section: Political Regimes and American Judicial Decision Makingmentioning
confidence: 99%