Willi am H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forevermuch to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century, Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench.1 By the end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term. In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, the next Presi dent may also enjoy the opportunity to select at least two other Jus tices. Justice John Paul Stevens, the next most senior member of the Court, will turn eighty-four by the end of the next presidential term and will have served on the Court for thirty years. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the third most senior member of the Court, will have turned seventy-four and have served for twenty-three years. This Review is not intended to be a morbid exercise in the actuar ial sciences. Rather, these numbers serve only to suggest that after six years in mothballs, the Supreme Court appointments process will be returning to active duty in relatively short order. This event will not be universally welcomed because many believe that the confirmation process has become too political or has failed to live up to the original

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Widespread public mistrust of legislative redistricting begs the question: Can (presumably) neutral and independent courts produce more competitive districts that preserve the integrity of the democratic process? The regime politics perspective suggests not, portraying courts as partisan collaborators whose rulings help their regime allies in the other branches. Conversely, recent congressional elections research suggests that non-legislative approaches to redistricting (such as independent commissions) encourage experienced candidates to mount serious electoral challenges to incumbents. We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of judicial participation in the redistricting process. Using data for the 2000 apportionment cycle, we test whether judicial redistricting enhances the competitiveness of congressional elections, as some studies suggest, or if it instead serves to promote the interests of the party with which the judge is affiliated, as the regime politics literature would lead us to believe. Our findings suggest that judicial redistricting does enhance competition in congressional elections, but we fail to find evidence that it confers any partisan advantage.

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