In Defense of a Political Court

Peretti, Terri

doi:10.1515/9781400823352

Cited by 88 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Once placed on the Court, the justices base their decisions on these ideological preferences (Peretti 2003, 357; Klarman 2004, 447–48; see Keck 2007b, 528–29) 4 . Consequently, “the values of the justices mirror and certainly lie within the range of those values currently or recently receiving official representation in other branches of government” (Peretti 1999, 5; see Klarman 2004, 6). As a result, “[e]xcept for short‐lived transitional periods .…”

Section: Foundations Of Regime Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, according to the RPA, coalition members use the process of presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation to ensure that members of the federal judiciary share their ideology and policy preferences (Peretti 1999, 119; Pickerill and Clayton 2004, 236; Clayton and Pickerill 2006, 1391; Gillman 2006, 108; Tushnet 2006, 329; Whittington 2007, 87–93) 3 . Once placed on the Court, the justices base their decisions on these ideological preferences (Peretti 2003, 357; Klarman 2004, 447–48; see Keck 2007b, 528–29) 4 .…”

Section: Foundations Of Regime Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Rethinking Regime Politics

Hall

2012

Law soc. inq.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many recent studies of "regime politics" argue that judicial review is ultimately used to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime. I explore this claim by evaluating whether the invalidation of federal laws by the US Supreme Court fits the empirical expectations of the regime politics approach. I find that the Court frequently invalidates statutes when (1) the ideology of the Court diverges from that of the sitting elected branches (suggesting that the Court does not fear sanctions or nonimplementation), and (2) the ideology of the sitting elected branches converges with that of the elected branches that enacted the statute (suggesting that the Court is defying the sitting elected branches). My findings suggest that the Court does not primarily use judicial review to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime.

show abstract

Section: Foundations Of Regime Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Foundations Of Regime Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Regime Politics

Hall

2012

Law soc. inq.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This literature highlights three institutional factors that might lead the Court to promote regime interests. First, due to the appointment process, members of the federal judiciary tend to share the ideology of the governing coalition (Moraski and Shipan, ; Peretti, :119; Stimson, Machuen, and Erikson, ). Accordingly, judges may tend to promote regime interests as they pursue their own policy preferences.…”

Section: The Regime Politics Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keeping the Outliers in Line? Judicial Review of State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court

Hall

Black

2012

Social Science Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Objective. Proponents of the "regime politics" approach argue that the U.S. Supreme Court tends to promote the interests of the dominant partisan coalition even while engaging in seemingly countermajoritarian behavior. These scholars suggest that the Court's invalidation of state laws is used to enforce a national consensus against outlier states. We argue this claim does not withstand empirical analysis. Method. We employ logistic regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between the invalidation of state laws by the Court and the ideological distance between the sitting national government and the state government that enacted the law. Results. Our analysis fails to find support for the regime enforcement hypothesis; in fact, we find evidence of a negative relationship between ideological distance and invalidation. Conclusions. Our findings suggest that regime politics scholars have underestimated the Court's countermajoritarian role in reviewing state legislation.

show abstract

“…Conversely, Sunstein (1996a, 1996b) counsels courts to take a minimalist approach when deciding complex issues. By leaving things undecided, Sunstein argues, courts allow political processes to unfold, which are beneficial not just because the other branches may seem more “majoritarian” than courts, but because the interplay among competing interest groups in diverse institutional settings promises to enhance participation and broaden support for policies (see also Peretti 1999; Feeley and Rubin 1998). Eskridge (1988) similarly argues judges should interpret statutes more aggressively when narrow interests have likely captured the legislative process (see also Posner 1982; Easterbrook 1983; Macey 1986).…”

Section: The Legal Process School Past and Presentmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy‐Making Responsibility

Barnes

2009

Law soc. inq.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A central question in American policy making is when should courts address complex policy issues, as opposed to defer to other forums? Legal process analysis offers a standard answer. It holds that judges should act when adjudication offers advantages over other modes of social ordering such as contracts, legislation, or agency rule making. From this vantage, the decision to use common law adjudication to address a sprawling public health crisis was a terrible mistake, as asbestos litigation has come to represent the very worst of mass tort litigation. This article questions this view, arguing that legal process analysis distorts the institutional choices underlying the American policy-making process. Indeed, once one considers informational and political constraints, as well as how the branches of government can fruitfully share policy-making functions, the asbestos litigation seems a reasonable and, in some ways, exemplary, use of judicial power .

show abstract

In Defense of a Political Court

Cited by 88 publications

References 0 publications

Rethinking Regime Politics

Rethinking Regime Politics

Keeping the Outliers in Line? Judicial Review of State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court

In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy‐Making Responsibility

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About