Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy

Abstract

In this article, I focus on epistemic arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that these could benefit by distancing themselves from the 'best judge' principle, according to which every person is the best judge of her or his own best interests. Instead, I suggest that it can rely on a more modest 'necessary interlocutor' principle whereby persons ought to be included within deliberations over their interests. Second, I argue that the epistemic case against competencebased disenfranchisement could benefit by focusing further on the specific epistemic costs that follow from the exclusion of already disadvantaged social groups from the deliberative process. Such exclusion is likely to worsen the 'strategic avoidance' to which privileged social groups are in any case susceptible. Finally, I argue that current epistemic critics of epistocracy ignore how its basis for exclusion entails consequences that are relevant to our assessment of its justifiability. I emphasise how disenfranchisement on the grounds of incompetence would vitiate deliberation by devaluing those excluded from the vote.

Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An Epistemic Defense of Really Existing Democracies

“…Klosko 2000Klosko , 2005? Deliberative democrats sought to address the challenge of public dissonance and fallibility by placing greater emphasis on citizens engagement in dialogue, creating opportunities for engaged citizens to become aware of, consider and critically examine their own views and the views of others (Bhatia 2020;Bohman 2007;Chambers 2021;J. Cohen 1997;Dryzek et al 2019;Estlund 2008;Habermas 1996;Landemore 2012), potentially leading to some convergence on policy priorities and solutions (Dryzek et al 2019;Habermas 1996Habermas , 2003.…”

The Political Ideas Underpinning Political Distrust: Analysing Four Types of Anti-politics

“…First, 'rational speculation' refers to the normative expectation that 'the general interest' can be gleaned from combining different forms of evidence to generate expertise, which in turn can inform fair decision-making processes to achieve valued goods (fairness, justice, liberty and so on). This normative preference has its roots in theories of democracy that set up 'epistemic' criteria for the success of democratic institutions and is essentially technocratic in nature (Bhatia, 2018). Epistemic democracy claims that 'the best decision method is one that is both procedurally fair and is epistemically valuable in approximating a procedure-independent standard' (Mackie, 2009, p. 141).…”

The case for epistocratic republicanism

“…Estlund (2009: 36, 215–217) makes the provision that when assessing potential epistocrats, there ought to be ‘no invidious comparisons’; the concern that there could be empirically latent prejudices which negate the benefits of education is sufficient to reject all potential candidates or groups of candidates. Several critics of epistocracy have reinforced this point that educated people are no less prone to cognitive biases and groupthink as anyone else (Bhatia, 2018: 12–13; Klocksiem, 2019: 14–16; Runciman, 2018: 183–184). However, the republican concern with systemic domination is more parsimonious.…”

“…This enables someone like Thomas Jefferson to declare that all men are created equal while simultaneously owning slaves and decrying the savagery of Native Americans as colonists drive them from their land (Mills, 2017: 62). Udit Bhatia (2018: 13–14) gives the example of ‘the dictators game’ to show how people avoid information when it does not suit them. The game gives its players two options: the first gives the player a very high pay off and another recipient a very low pay off; the second gives the player a slightly lower payoff than the first option, but a much higher payoff to the recipient.…”

“…Those who conducted the experiment concluded that there was only an ‘illusory preference for fairness’ Dana et al (2007: 67). Bhatia (2018: 14–16) mobilises this in his critique of epistocracy to explore how epistocrats lack the motivation to engage with structural injustices because of epistemic avoidance. It is a compelling argument that is valuable to republicans, because it is not only that they lack the motivation, due to internal cognitive biases, but that there is no power to compel motivation.…”