Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy

Abstract

Research stresses that congressional committees increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government. We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees seem to engage in what we call "retrospective oversight" and take advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding retrospective oversight.

Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power

“…Furthermore, with respect to transitions, only the legislative veto model predicts that inspections should not increase after the president changes parties following a period of divided government, at least not inspections designed to impose constraints on agencies (see Proposition , part c). Consistent with this, MacDonald and McGrath () find that although there is an increase in oversight hearings after such transitions, these hearings are targeted at allied agencies and are largely designed to stimulate the development of new policies, not to overturn policies passed in the prior period of divided government.…”

“…CMS promptly shelved the proposed rule, despite the Obama administration's initial plans to have it finalized within months of publishing the proposed rule . More aggressively, Congress can subject administrative policy makers to hearings and subpoenas (Ainsworth, Harward and Moffett ; Kriner and Schwartz ; MacDonald and McGrath ). Like letters, these activities also do not have binding policy consequences, although they may have influence nonetheless (Christenson and Kriner ), such as by diminishing agency morale (Marvel and McGrath ), undermining an agency's public support (Kriner and Schickler ), paralyzing agency decision making by diverting the attention of its top officials (Oleszek ), or warning the agency that Congress has the resolve to explore more severe punitive measures (Cameron and Rosendorff ) .…”

When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission

“…We consider the trade‐policy behavior of members of Congress away from Capitol Hill, in this case before administrative agencies. Our focus on legislative participation in agency decision making departs from the majority of the literature on the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy, which focuses on congressional delegation and Congress's subsequent use of administrative constraints, oversight, and appropriations to hold agencies accountable (e.g., Krause ; MacDonald and McGrath ; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast ; McCubbins and Schwarz ). In short, we assert that congressional participation at the ITC illustrates a previously unexamined way for legislators to play a role in policymaking.…”

Don't Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees

“…In the face of limited committee staff, it is possible that certain committees and members have learned to be more strategic in how they deploy and acquire resources to fulfill their legislative and oversight functions (MacDonald and McGrath ; Madonna and Ostrander ). This begs the question, given the demands to produce research and analysis, craft legislation, and conduct oversight, how do committees supplement their existing capacity and expertise to accomplish these functions?…”

“…If members of Congress believe their individual electoral fates are at least in part tied to the performance of the institution as a whole, then why are members of Congress willing to reduce capacity and expertise in congressional committees? A possible explanation is that members of Congress and their committees have learned to be more strategic in how they deploy and acquire resources to fulfill their legislative and oversight functions (MacDonald and McGrath ; Madonna and Ostrander ). This begs the question, given the demands to produce research and analysis, craft legislation, and conduct oversight, how can committees supplement their existing capacity and expertise to aid the performance of the institution as a whole?…”