Objective. Debate about market-oriented school-choice proposals often centers on questions of whether they will help or hurt minorities and the poor. We examine the locational decisions of different types of charter schools in the District of Columbia (D.C.) to assess their distributional consequences. Methods. We employ ordered probit regression to estimate models of the degree to which census tracts are served by charters. Results. Charters are more likely to locate in areas with high proportions of African-American and Hispanic residents than in the predominantly white neighborhoods, and more likely to locate in neighborhoods with middle incomes and high home ownership than in either poor or wealthy areas of the city. This is especially true of those operated by for-profits and those chartered by the elected rather than appointed chartering body. Additionally, we observe charters taking political and practical considerations into account when deciding where to locate. Conclusions. Proponents claim that charter schools will locate where need is greatest, while critics fear they will shy away from neighborhoods housing disadvantaged and minority students. We find that both camps are oversimplifying. Locational patterns are more complex and appear to be sensitive to variations in the type of charter school as well as the institutional characteristics of the chartering agency. Although market incentives are important, so too are pragmatic factors and institutional context.Charter schools have erupted on the landscape of American education with a speed and scope that is surprising, especially in light of that sector's reputation for bureaucratic resistance to new ideas. The nation's first charter school opened in Minnesota in 1992. Eight years later, more than 2,000 charter schools, in 34 states and the District of Columbia, were serving over half a million students (Center for Education Reform, 2000).

L imitation riders, which allow the U.S. Congress to forbid agencies from spending money for specific uses, enable congressional majorities to exert greater influence over bureaucratic policy decisions than is appreciated by research on policy making in the United States. I develop a theory of limitation riders, explaining why they lead to policy outcomes that are preferable to a majority of legislators compared to outcomes that would occur if this tool did not exist. I assess this perspective empirically by analyzing the volume of limitation riders reported in bills from 1993 to 2002 and all limitation riders forbidding regulatory actions from 1989 to 2009. In addition to supporting the conclusion that Congress possesses more leverage over agencies' decisions than is currently appreciated, the findings have implications for advancing theories of delegation.

Research investigating whether female legislators provide more effective substantive representation on women's issues than their male colleagues faces a significant methodological hurdle. Models used to estimate the effect of gender on representation inevitably omit constituency variables that affect the character of legislators' decisions and are also correlated with gender, potentially biasing the estimates of the effect of gender. Employing a quasi-experimental research design as an alternative strategy, the authors remove this hurdle and estimate the influence of gender on representation free from this potential bias. The authors find that gender does affect representation and observe critical mass effects.

Research stresses that congressional committees increase their oversight of the bureaucracy during divided government. We extend this research by developing an explanation, rooted in a more dynamic view of policymaking, for why Congress would sometimes conduct vigorous oversight under unified control as well. In short, committees seem to engage in what we call "retrospective oversight" and take advantage of newly friendly executive administration to refocus existing policy made under a past opposition president. We assess our perspective using two separate sources of data on oversight hearings spanning more than 60 years and find support for our claims regarding retrospective oversight.

When allocating distributive benefits, bureaucrats must balance their own policy preferences with requests from members of Congress. The elimination of earmarking may provide agency personnel with greater discretion in the allocation of distributive benefits. Using a novel data set of congressional letters written in support of their community’s air traffic control towers, we estimate a model that explores the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to issue national interest exemptions to continue operations at towers slated for closure as a result of budget sequestration. Our analysis suggests that members of Congress do not enjoy the influence they possessed under earmarking when using a new method, letter-marking, to influence how agencies distribute benefits.