Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper analyzes the conflicts of interest arising from the "revolving door". The revolving door is a common phenomenon, and it is unlikely that most of it can be explained by 'regulatory capture', a practice that is unlawful. Therefore, there is a need for a new framework. This paper proposes a framework wherein conflicts of interest arising from the revolving door are not unlawful, as is in the case of regulatory capture, but still lead to economic distortions. The paper introduces a market for bureaucratic capital, which explains why in equilibrium, the government allows this unethical, yet not unlawful, conflict of interest to persist. Our first result is that the political elite finds it optimal to allow the existence of the revolving door, as well as the creation of bureaucratic capital. The second result is that in equilibrium, the revolving door leads to an excessive level of bureaucratic capital. As a consequence, the interconnection of elites and the existence of the revolving door actually lead to lower economic growth.

Agency problems and interest representation: An empirical analysis of the costs of lobbying

“…Finally, it may well be worth focusing on the assumption of consumer sovereignty since agency problems constitute an intrusion of producer interests into exchange relationships. Thus, we might ask whether there is a meaningful market in lobby services, a question recently raised by LaPira and Thomas (2014). Is the lobby market sufficiently developed so that producers offer a differentiated array of services?…”

“…372-373) allow for some minor slippage between the interests of clients and contract lobbyists, they assume that the behavior of in-house lobbyists is fully controlled via hierarchical monitoring (Kersh, 2000, p. 241). Indeed, with few exceptions (Leech, 2013;LaPira and Thomas, 2014), lobbyists per se have now largely vanished as interesting actors in studies of interest representation. 1 They are at least implicitly viewed as superconducting transmitters linking the issues of concern to interest organizations to officials with no loss of energy and perfect fidelity.…”

Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress

“…LaPira and Thomas (2014) estimate the size of the revolving door lobbyist community, and both Baumgartner et al (2009) and Lazarus and McKay (2012) begin to assess how influential these lobbyists are. But we still have had little idea of who is most likely to become a revolving door lobbyist.…”

“…In response to the recent acceleration of Congress members and congressional staff becoming lobbyists, however, focus on the topic has increased (e.g., Vidal et al 2012, LaPira and Thomas 2014, Baumgartner et al 2009. This article adds to the growing body of research by asking which former members of Congress are most likely to become lobbyists.…”

“…Recent studies are creating a more accurate picture of the revolving-door population than has previously been available (Cain andDrutman 2014, LaPira andThomas 2014). In this article, we take a narrow analytical focus and ask specifically, which members of Congress are most Second, we look at the member's chamber.…”