Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs

Abstract

The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p<1, altruistic punishment turns out to be detrimental for cooperation for a wide range of payoff parameters, when compared to the scenario without punishment. The results imply that while locally, the introduction of peer punishment may seem to reduce the chances of free-riding, realistic population structure may drive the population towards the opposite scenario. Hence, structured populations effectively reduce the expected beneficial contribution of punishment to the emergence of cooperation which, if not carefully dosed, may in fact hinder the chances of widespread cooperation.

Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment

“…Recent experiments indicate that human punishment may be motivated by inequity aversion rather than by the desire for reciprocity [38], and evidence is mounting that emotions play a decisive role as well [18,28]. Sanctions may also be motivated by selfish or greedy intentions and spite, and if they are, sanctioning can have dire consequences for altruistic cooperation and the evolutionary advantages are questionable [39][40][41]. These considerations support the notion of probabilistic sanctioning, and indeed it seems unreasonable to expect of individuals to execute punishment either rationally or permanently.…”

Good Agreements Make Good Friends

“…However, there is also evidence that CP may not be beneficial to cooperation or fails to prevail in populations playing one-shot PD games or public goods games, even when (e.g.) direct reciprocity212223, indirect reciprocity24, networked populations25 or optional participation26 are considered. As such, this work provides an important novel approach for understanding the emergence of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, in which both commitment and punishment strategies are explicitly (and independently) considered.…”

Sacred values in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: resistance to social influence, temporal discounting, and exit strategies

“…A key difficulty in motivating and sustaining collective action in the long run involves immunizing the group from individual defections. Monitoring and punishment of free riders and norm violators provides one set of means; however, a punishment regime is often costly to maintain and does little to eliminate inducements to defect that become attractive whenever and wherever vigilance is lax . Work on religious rhetoric and rituals suggest that these aspects of religion help to bind group members to long‐term mutual commitments by internalizing religious beliefs into values adhered to through self‐policing .…”

“…Monitoring and punishment of free riders and norm violators provides one set of means; 36 however, a punishment regime is often costly to maintain and does little to eliminate inducements to defect that become attractive whenever and wherever vigilance is lax. 37 Work on religious rhetoric and rituals suggest that these aspects of religion help to bind group members to long-term mutual commitments by internalizing religious beliefs into values adhered to through selfpolicing. 38,39 Once internalized, such values appear to be less subject to the pressures and enticements of the here-and-now, such as the opinion of others and the lure of short-term goals and advantages.…”