Reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain with sequential manufacturers' price competition

Wang, Wenbin; Fan, Lingling; Ma, Peng; Zhang, Peng; Lu, Zhenguo

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.08.104

Cited by 41 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…They found that the subsidy can promote remanufacturing activities. Wang et al (2017) [22] examined a reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain that includes two sequential competing manufacturers and one retailer. They assumed that the government can implement the reward-penalty mechanism to the closed-loop supply chain.…”

Section: Closed-loop Supply Chain With Government Tax and Subsidymentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Liu

Nishi

2019

Sustainability

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The government plays a critical role in the promotion of recycling strategy among supply chain members. The purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal government policies on closed-loop supply chains and how these policies impact the market demand and the returning strategies of manufacturers and retailers. This paper presents a design of closed-loop supply chains under government regulation by considering a novel three-stage game theoretic model. Firstly, Stackelberg models are adopted to describe the one-shot game between the manufacturer and the retailer in a local market. Secondly, based on the Stackelberg equilibriums, a repeated and dynamic population game is developed. Thirdly, the government analyzes the population game to find the optimal tax and subsidy policies in the whole market. To solve the proposed model, the idea of backward induction is adopted. The results suggest that, by collecting tax and allocating subsidy, the government can influence the market demands and return rates. The centralized supply chain structure is always preferred for the government and the market. The government prefers to allocate subsidy to low-pollution, low-profit remanufactured products. The environmental attention of the government affects the subsidy policy.

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Section: Closed-loop Supply Chain With Government Tax and Subsidymentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Liu

Nishi

2019

Sustainability

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“…Jena and Sarmah [5] considered a CLSC consisting of two manufacturers and a single retailer, and analyzed the pricing problem under wholesale price competition among manufacturers. Wang et al [21] studied the reward and punishment mechanisms of CLSC under conditions of price competition among manufacturers. Xie et al [11] studied the contract coordination mechanism under the condition of channel sales price competition based on a dual-channel CLSC.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

et al. 2018

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This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.

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“…Wang et al investigated some RPMs under the centralized, the manufacturer-led, and the collector-led CLSCs [28]. Wang et al also examined the CLSC consisting of two sequential competing manufacturers and one retailer with or without the RPM from the government [29].…”

Section: Incentive Mechanisms For Rscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Except for the subsidy mechanism, the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) made by the government in a closed-loop supply chain is examined by Wang et al [27][28][29][30]. The RPM is one of incentive mechanisms which are usually used to coordinate forward and reverse supply chains.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Evolution Mechanism and Optimal Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Collection Strategies in Reverse Supply Chains: The Case of Waste Mobile Phones in China

et al. 2018

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The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.

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Reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain with sequential manufacturers' price competition

Cited by 41 publications

References 30 publications

Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Analysis of Evolution Mechanism and Optimal Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Collection Strategies in Reverse Supply Chains: The Case of Waste Mobile Phones in China

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